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SAMENVATTING 
Dit rapport bouwt voort op de vorige rapporten uit het onderzoekstraject ‘Het optimaliseren van 
de liberalisering van de handel in diensten – Begrenzing van de autonome nationale 
regelgeving?’ van pijler 1 ‘Internationaal en Europees recht’ van het Steunpunt ‘Buitenlands 
beleid, internationaal ondernemen en ontwikkelingssamenwerking’ voor de Vlaamse regering. 
 
Grensoverschrijdende handel in diensten wordt door zowel de Wereldhandelsorganisatie (WTO) 
als door 'preferentiële' handelsakkoorden gereguleerd. Op beide niveaus is de Europese Unie 
(EU) verplichtingen aangegaan die de handel in diensten liberaliseren en bijgevolg de nationale 
regelgevende autonomie beperken. Er bestaat immers een inherente spanning tussen de 
liberalisering van handel in diensten en nationale regelgevende autonomie: het 
vergemakkelijken van handel vereist, op een of andere manier, het inperken van beleidsruimte. 
Als gevolg van de fragmentering van de internationale regelgeving omtrent handel in diensten is 
een complex web van verplichtingen ontstaan. Dat heeft geleid tot aanzienlijke onzekerheid 
over de exacte reikwijdte van deze verplichtingen en, bijgevolg, over hun impact op nationale 
regelgevende autonomie. Dit onderzoek analyseert de relevante bepalingen uit de Algemene 
Overeenkomst betreffende de Handel in Diensten (GATS), gesloten in het kader van de WTO, 
zoals deze van toepassing is op de EU. De complexe structuur en vaagheid van deze 
overeenkomst heeft aanzienlijke ruimte voor debat over de reikwijdte van vele bepalingen uit 
GATS gelaten. Daarna, en voortbouwend op deze analyse, wordt de impact van de 
verplichtingen die voortvloeien uit een aantal handelsakkoorden van de EU op de nationale 
regelgevende autonomie onderzocht.  
 
In het eerste deel van dit rapport wordt de keuze voor drie handelsakkoorden als casestudy 
toegelicht. Deze casestudies worden aangehouden voor het volgende rapport betreffende 
Europese vrijhandelsakkoorden en voor de doctoraatsthesis die in het kader van dit 
onderzoekstraject wordt geschreven. Op basis van een ‘mapping’ van dienstenverplichtingen en 
een analyse van bepalingen betreffende verdragsinterpretatie worden de EU-Colombia en Peru, 
EU-Singapore en EU-Georgië handelsakkoorden geselecteerd. Vervolgens introduceert het 
rapport een vermoeden van WTO-conforme interpretatie. Dit vermoeden kan weerlegd worden 
indien het duidelijk is dat de onderhandelaars van de vrijhandelsakkoorden beoogden een 
andere interpretatie te geven. 
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Het tweede deel van dit rapport bespreekt de structurele flexibiliteit van de 
dienstenhoofdstukken van de geselecteerde EU vrijhandelsakkoorden. Deze flexibiliteit bestaat 
zowel op het niveau van de verplichtingen als op het niveau van de Lijsten van specifieke 
verbintenissen. 
 
Vervolgens wordt, in de derde sectie, het toepassingsgebied van de dienstenhoofdstukken van 
de geselecteerde akkoorden nader bekeken. Dit toepassingsgebied is ruimer dan het al ruime 
toepassingsgebied van GATS. Met name wat betreft het equivalent van de zogeheten ‘Modus 3’ 
dienstverlening, is een duidelijke verruiming tegenover GATS vast te stellen. De aanpak die de 
EU hier hanteert lijkt eerder op het recht op vestiging uit het recht van de Europese interne 
markt. 
 
Het vierde en laatste deel van het rapport gaat in op de onvoorwaardelijke verbintenissen in de 
dienstenhoofdstukken van de geselecteerde vrijhandelsakkoorden. Vooreerst moet worden 
opgemerkt dat er geen onvoorwaardelijke verplichting tot meestbegunstiging in de 
vrijhandelsakkoorden te vinden is. Ten tweede zijn alle bepalingen met betrekking tot 
transparantie in de vrijhandelsakkoorden onvoorwaardelijk. Deze bepalingen beperken de 
regelgevende autonomie echter in slechts beperkte mate, gelet op de voornamelijk procedurele 
aard van de verplichtingen. Ten derde blijkt slechts één bepaling, in het EU-Colombia en Peru 
handelsakkoord, betreffende de zogeheten ‘binnenlandse regelingen’ van Artikel VI GATS 
onvoorwaardelijk van toepassing te zijn. Omdat deze bepaling uitermate gelinkt is aan de 
voorwaardelijke equivalenten in GATS en de andere twee EU vrijhandelsakkoorden, wordt deze 
bepaling niet verder geanalyseerd in dit rapport.  
 
Ten vierde worden verplichtingen betreffende monopolies en exclusieve rechten besproken. De 
hieronder vallende artikelen die betrekking hebben op mededinging verwijzen grotendeels terug 
naar nationaal mededingingsrecht. Zij beperken de regelgevende autonomie niet. Daarnaast 
bevatten andere bepalingen non-discriminatieverplichtingen. Deze bepalingen laten overheden 
niet toe te discrimineren bij het verlenen van diensten door staatsmonopolies met een 
commercieel karakter. De Lijst van EU verbintenissen in het EU-Georgië vrijhandelsakkoord 
omvat daarnaast meer verbintenissen betreffende monopolies. Het gevolg is dat er minder 
beleidsruimte overblijft om bepaalde monopolies te creëren. Toch lijken deze verbintenissen 
eerder de realiteit te weerspiegelen. De beperkingen op regelgevende autonomie lijken aldus 
beperkt. Ten vijfde bespreekt dit rapport verplichtingen met betrekking tot betalingen en 
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overmakingen. Met uitzondering van de reikwijdte van deze bepalingen, die besproken wordt, is 
het bijzonder moeilijk de daadwerkelijke impact op regelgevende autonomie te bespreken, gelet 
op de impact van de (niet besproken) bepalingen omtrent financiële dienstverlening. Ten zesde 
worden enkele onvoorwaardelijke GATS-X bepalingen besproken. Het gaat om mededinging, 
overheidsopdrachten, investeringen, subsidies en harmonisering. Met uitzondering van 
bepalingen omtrent investeringen bevatten deze bepalingen geen beperkingen op regelgevende 
autonomie, of zijn ze uitgesloten van de geschillenbeslechtingsmechanismen van de 
vrijhandelsakkoorden. 
 
Bij wijze van conclusie kan worden gesteld dat de onvoorwaardelijke verbintenissen in 
dienstenhoofdstukken van deze vrijhandelsakkoorden geen substantiële beperkingen op de 
regelgevende autonomie met zich meebrengen. Het ruime toepassingsgebied van deze 
hoofdstukken, daarentegen, versterkt de eventuele beperkingen op regelgevende autonomie 
die het gevolg zijn van, onder meer, de non-discriminatieverplichtingen en de 
markttoegangbepalingen die in het volgende rapport besproken worden. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Het onderzoek dat aan de basis ligt van dit rapport kadert in het programma ‘Steunpunten voor 
Beleidsrelevant Onderzoek’ dat gefinancierd wordt door de Vlaamse Overheid. Wij danken de 
Vlaamse Overheid voor de financiële steun en interesse in het onderzoek. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As is the case under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS),2 the services chapters of European Union (EU) regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) generally contain two types of obligation. On the one hand, conditional obligations only 
apply to sectors for which specific commitments have been scheduled. On the other hand, some 
unconditional obligations apply to all services covered by the services chapters. In contrast to 
the conditional obligations, which apply only to sectors in which specific commitments have 
been scheduled, these obligations cannot be shaped by the parties to the RTA. Hence, from the 
perspective of a regulator, it is crucial to understand the exact meaning of one’s obligations 
regarding all measures which fall within the wide scope of the services chapter of an RTA. 
 
This report assesses the constraints on regulatory autonomy from the unconditional obligations 
in the services chapters of a selection of the EU RTAs. Therefore, three aspects must be 
addressed: (i) the scope of the obligation, (ii) its substantive content, and (iii) any relevant 
exceptions to the obligation. The scope of the EU RTAs’ services chapters is the subject of 
section C of this report. The scope and substantive content of the unconditional obligations is 
covered in section D. The relevant exceptions are assessed in the doctoral dissertation that is 
part of this research track. Finally, we draw some preliminary conclusions. 
 
However, before addressing the aforementioned issues, this paper presents the selection of 
case studies for this report, the subsequent report on policy space in EU RTAs and the said 
doctoral dissertation in section A. Moreover, this section sets out the interpretative framework of 
obligations in the EU RTAs’ services chapters. Additionally, in section B, we address the 
structural flexibility of these services chapters to set the scene for this and the subsequent 
report on EU RTAs. 
 
It should again be stressed that this report is part of a larger work in process, in which all GATS 
obligations and exceptions, and the obligations and exceptions in the selected EU RTAs’ 
services chapters will be addressed in a similar way.  
 
                                               
2
 Rudolf Adlung, ‘Public Services and the GATS’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 455, 459. 
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A. CASE STUDY SELECTION 
The EU has concluded a vast amount of RTAs and is currently negotiating many more.3 
Although not all of these agreements include provisions on services, the more recent RTAs do 
(with the exception of the interim Economic Partnership Agreements concluded with developing 
countries from the African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) Group of States).4 A rough analysis of EU 
RTA practice allowed us, in a previous report in the context of the Policy Research Centre, to 
draw up four categories of EU RTAs with services chapters, based on these services 
provisions.5 
1. Trade agreements between the EU and official or potential EU member candidates. 
These countries are being prepared by the RTA for their accession to the EU;  
2. RTAs between the EU and neighbouring states; 
3. RTAs with services provisions focused on the development of trading partners;  
4. EU RTAs with a more outspoken economic rationale, which, as concerns the services 
provisions of the trade chapters, aim primarily at obtaining global market access for 
European services and services providers. 
It should be pointed out that, based on our analysis of services provisions, the assertion that 
there is “only a limited sense of ownership of the agreements by the developing countries [i.e. 
                                               
3
 European Commission, Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations (Updated 27 October, 2014). For more 
context, see for example Marise Cremona, ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements’ in Christoph 
Herrmann and Jörg Philipp Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 1 (Springer 
Verlag 2010); Colin Brown, ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements’ in Christoph Herrmann and Jörg 
Philipp Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 3 (Springer Verlag 2012); Der-Chin 
Horng, ‘Reshaping the EU’s FTA Policy in a Globalizing Economy: The Case of the EU-Korea FTA’ (2012) 46 Journal 
of World Trade 301; Patrick A Messerlin, The EU Preferential Trade Agreements: Defining Priorities for a Debt-
Ridden, Growth-Starving EU (SciencesPo Groupe D'Economie Mondiale Working Paper, 2012); David Kleimann (ed) 
EU Preferential Trade Agreements: Commerce, Foreign Policy, and Development Aspects (European University 
Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and Department of Law 2013); Roberto Bendini, In-depth 
Analysis: The European Union’s Trade Policy, Five Years after the Lisbon Treaty (European Parliament Directorate-
General for External Policies of the European Union DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2014_76, 2014); Kenneth Heydon and 
Stephen Woolcock, Comparing International Trade Policies: The EU, United States, EFTA and Japanese PTA 
Strategies (Study for the European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Union 
EXPO/B/INTA/FWC/2009-01/Lot7/36, 2014). 
4
 World Trade Organization, ‘Regional Trade Agreements Database’ (2014)  
<http://rtais.wto.org/ui/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx> accessed 3 March 2014. 
5
 Bregt Natens and Jan Wouters, Mapping Services Liberalisation Commitments in European Union Regional Trade 
Agreements (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper 116, 2013) 11. Also see Heidi Ullrich, 
Comparing EU Free Trade Agreements Services (European Centre for Development Policy Management In Brief 6C, 
2004) and Cremona, ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements’. 
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counterparties]. The EU imposes its own terms and conditions”6 also applies to the services 
chapters of the RTAs and to developed country counterparties. 
 
An analysis of services commitments in these RTAs highlights that the agreements in the first 
category are mainly aimed at implementing the EU acquis into the legal order of the 
counterparties. In the common strategy for the region, the Stabilisation and Association 
Process, the EU envisages the accession of these newly independent Balkan states once the 
Copenhagen criteria are fulfilled.7 One of the key aspects of the strategy was the drafting of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements, which, according to their preambles, seek to 
enhance the political, economic and institutional stabilisation in the region through, among other 
things,  enhanced trade and economic cooperation. For the purpose of this research project, the 
trade pillars of these agreements are not the best case studies;  they are unlikely to contain 
more or other obligations for the EU.  
 
The RTAs in the second category have a similar objective of integration in the EU internal 
market, although in a ‘lighter’ form.8 The agreements with partner countries in the Mediterranean 
contain very few binding provisions on trade in services. The European Commission has 
launched negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Morocco 
(2013) and an ambitious RTA with Libya (on hold at the time of writing, September 2014). 
Preparations for DCFTA negotiations are on-going with Jordan and Tunisia. Talks on the 
liberalisation of trade in services with Egypt and Israel are on hold. No such talks are being held 
with Algeria, Lebanon and Palestine.9 In the Eastern Neighbourhood, as noted in Table 1, the 
negotiations for DCFTAs have progressed further: the DCFTAs with Georgia and Moldova were 
signed and apply provisionally since 1 September 2014. The provisional application of the trade 
chapter of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA has been postponed until 31 December 2015.10 Talks with 
                                               
6
 Matthew McQueen, ‘The EU's Free–trade Agreements with Developing Countries: A Case of Wishful Thinking?’ 
(2002) 25 The World Economy 1369, 1384. 
7
 The Copenhagen criteria must be met by candidate-Member States to become part of the EU. They include the 
existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the EU. See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of 21-22 June 
(1993). 
8
 Michael Emerson, Countdown to the Vilnius Summit: The EU´s trade relations with Moldova and the South 
Caucasus (Study for the European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Union 
Workshop on Countdown to the Vilnius Summit: The EU's trade relations with Moldova and the South Caucasus 
EXPO/B/FWC/2009-01/Lot 7/39, 2014) 17 and 22. 
9
 European Commission, Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations. 
10
 European Commission, Joint Ministerial Statement on the Implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA, 
Statement/14/276, 12 September (2014) 
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Armenia are being assessed after Armenia’s declaration to join the Russian customs union.11 
Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether these agreements will include far-reaching 
commitments for the EU, especially considering the relative economic insignificance of the 
counterparties and the political and strategic priorities of the European Neighbourhood Policy.12 
 
The third category of RTAs comprises EU RTAs that have focused primarily on the development 
of the trading partner. The main target of these RTAs has been the ACP Group of States. The 
trade policy picture vis-à-vis these countries is complex. 2007 saw the end of the WTO waiver 
under which ACP countries were allowed non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU market. 
An extension of this waiver proved to be politically infeasible at the WTO and a trade regulation 
solution compliant with WTO law was sought.13 Articles 36-38 of the 2010 Consolidated 
Cotonou Agreement obliges the signatory partners to take all the necessary measures to ensure 
the conclusion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which combine trade with 
technical assistance.14 The 2007 deadline was not met and no EPA has yet entered into force, 
although some EPAs are being applied provisionally. In 2014, negotiations for an EPA were 
concluded with the South African Development Community and West Africa. Both EPAs are 
being prepared for signature. However, the controversy surrounding the link between 
development and regional integration on the one hand and whether the EPAs are in effect 
development-friendly on the other, appears to have played a substantial role in the lack of 
concluded agreements.15 The two concluded agreements, with South Africa and Iraq, contain 
few relevant services provisions. Consequently, the RTAs in the third category do not seem 
suitable for our purposes. 
 
The fourth category of RTAs are those concluded to open up global markets to European 
businesses. Analysis of the services provisions in these RTAs confirm the presumption that the 
                                               
11
 European Commission, Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations. 
12
 European External Action Service, ‘What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?’ (2014)  
<http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm> accessed 7 March 2014. 
13
 Pierre Sauvé and Natasha Ward, The EC-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement: Assessing the 
Outcome on Services and Investment (European Centre for International Political Economy Paper, 2009) 2. 
14
 [2010] OJ L287/3, 4 November 2010, Agreement Amending for the Second Time the Partnership Agreement 
between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States and the European Community, signed in 
Cotonou on 23  June 2000, as first amended in Luxembourg on 25  June 2005. See, on the difficulties and 
controversy surrounding the conclusion of EPAs with African countries, Getahun Seifu, ‘The Interplay of the ACP-EU 
Economic Partnership Agreements and the Rules of the World Trade Organization: Double Jeopardy for Africa’ 
(2006) 6 Irish Yearbook of International Law 191, where the conundrum between WTO-compatibility and previous 
non-reciprocal trade measures that focus on development aspects is examined. 
15
 Cremona, ‘The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements’ 262. 
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most extensive services liberalisation is found in the more recent RTAs of this category. The 
temporal aspect highlights the increasing liberalisation of trade in services. Unlike for the 
agreements in the other categories, the explicit intent of these agreements is trade liberalisation. 
Geo-strategic and -political motives arguably play a lesser role than is the case in the first two 
categories. Hence, with the noted caveat for a DCFTA, the fourth category seems most relevant 
for our purposes, considering that it is most appropriate to select case studies likely to have the 
greatest impact on regulatory autonomy. This is the case because the research in this research 
track aims at setting out the outer limits of constraints on regulatory autonomy resulting from 
trade liberalisation in services. 
 
Reiterating the above, the most promising case studies are recent RTAs of the fourth category 
and ‘new generation’ DCFTAs. The analysis indicated that although within each category many 
provisions are copied from one agreement to another and that a general template exists, each 
RTA is unique. We therefore opt to analyse several EU RTAs. Considering these criteria, the 
following long list of agreements (ordered chronologically) appear most suited as case studies: 
a. EU-CARIFORUM RTA; 
b. EU-Korea RTA; 
c. EU-Central America RTA; 
d. EU-Colombia and Peru RTA; 
e. EU-Singapore RTA, of which the text is available. The agreement is initialled but has not 
yet been signed;16 
f. EU-Georgia DCFTA; 
g. EU-Moldova DCFTA; 
h. EU-Ukraine DCFTA, of which the text was not available at the time of writing. The 
agreement has been signed but not yet published.17 
 
Considering the crucial importance of treaty interpretation for the purposes of assessing 
constraints on regulatory autonomy resulting from legal provisions on trade in services, the 
selection of case studies from the RTAs listed above will take into account the various 
approaches to treaty interpretation enshrined in the agreements. 
 
                                               
16
 The initialling of the text is a step prior to signature that allows all relevant institutions to scrutinise the text. See 
European Commission, Factsheet: Trade Negotiations Step by Step (2013).  
17
 The conclusion of the EU-Canada RTA (and publication of the agreement’s text) and the negotiations with the U.S. 
for TTIP, with Japan and in the context of TiSA are not finished on time for this project’s purposes. 
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1. Treaty interpretation in RTAs 
1.1 Rules and guidance for interpreting RTAs 
To comprehend the meaning of an agreement, one must interpret its provisions. Interpretation is 
a key tool of adjudication.18 In the case of RTAs, as with any treaty, one must begin by 
considering the explicit rules of interpretation enshrined in the agreement itself. In the absence 
of such provisions, the rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), enshrined in Articles 31-33, apply, as they are customary international law. Applying the 
VCLT rules of interpretation leaves an interpreter ample flexibility as the VCLT rules of 
interpretation are not exhaustive and can provide possibilities such as, for example, being able 
to apply different weights to the different interpretational methods mentioned in the VCLT.19  
 
In the case of the WTO, Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) holds that 
the dispute settlement bodies serve to clarify the existing provisions of the covered agreements 
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. WTO case law is 
of the utmost importance in understanding the constraints on regulatory autonomy that result 
from a Member’s obligations. Many RTAs contain dispute settlement mechanisms. In the case 
of the EU, the large majority of RTAs with services chapters contain dispute settlement 
mechanisms of the quasi-judicial model, i.e. the complainant has an automatic right of access to 
dispute settlement, where the dispute is settled by an ad hoc adjudicating body and a standing 
body for appeals.20 However, there is no dispute settlement practice by these ad hoc bodies. 
Reasons for continuing to include such mechanisms in RTAs are among others their potential 
deterring effect vis-à-vis possible violations, or the necessity of a ‘stick’ for credibility during 
negotiations.21 
 
However, a peculiar feature of most RTAs’ dispute settlement mechanisms  is a striking lack of 
case law. Although many RTAs contain dispute settlement mechanisms, only the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court, the North American 
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 Joost Pauwelyn and Manfred Elsig, ‘The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations across 
International Tribunals’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International 
Law and International Relations (Cambridge University Press 2013) 445. 
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 Ibid 448. The authors set out a framework for explaining variation in treaty interpretation by international tribunals. 
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 Claude Chase and others, Mapping of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements – Innovative 
or Variations on a Theme? (World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division Staff Working 
Paper ERSD-2013-07, 2013) 10-11 and 54-55. 
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Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dispute settlement mechanisms, the MERCOSUR dispute 
settlement mechanism, the Court of Justice of the Andean Community, and the Central 
American Court of Justice of the Central American Common Market show “significant activity”.22 
Only a handful of other cases have been noted: one in the case of the Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, four at the Caribbean Court of Justice, 
and four in the context of the Chile-MERCOSUR Free Trade Agreement (ALADI).23 Insofar as 
information is publicly available, no cases have been brought under EU RTA dispute settlement. 
A key message from the WTO’s 2011 World Trade Report was that Members continue to use 
WTO dispute settlement in relation to RTA partners.24 In 82 of the 443 disputes brought before 
the WTO at that time, the complainant and respondent were RTA partners.25  
 
Nonetheless, the practical importance of RTAs26 highlights that interpreting the legal provisions 
in EU RTAs is likely to play an important role. Regardless of the lack of use of RTA dispute 
settlement, the legal meaning of RTA provisions and their interpretation remains crucial in 
understanding how RTAs limit regulatory autonomy. Being aware of the lack of interpretational 
guidance from case law, first, concerning the interpretational rules of the RTAs and, second, 
concerning the substantive content of the provisions, one must resort to an interpretation based 
on the text of the agreement and the available interpretational tools. 
 
1.2 Treaty interpretation in the case study long list 
In order to determine how to interpret an agreement, one must begin by assessing the text of 
the agreement itself. In this list of case studies, three different types of rules of interpretation are 
found. First, Article 14.16 of the EU-Korea RTA reads  
“Any arbitration panel shall interpret [all provisions of this Agreement, unless 
otherwise provided] in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law, including those codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Where an obligation under this Agreement is identical to an obligation 
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 World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-
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under the WTO Agreement, the arbitration panel shall adopt an interpretation which 
is consistent with any relevant interpretation established in rulings of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter referred to as the ‘DSB’). The rulings of the 
arbitration panel cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided for in 
[all provisions of this Agreement, unless otherwise provided].”27 
The EU-Singapore RTA includes a provision that is substantially the same in Article 15.18. In 
the case of the EU-Central America RTA, it is added in Article 322.1 that due account must be 
taken of the fact that the parties must perform the agreement in good faith and avoid 
circumvention of their obligations.  
 
Second, the EU-CARIFORUM RTA is similar to the EU-Korea example, except that Article 219 
does not contain a reference to interpretations by the WTO dispute settlement organs. Article 
317 of the EU-Colombia and Peru RTA is identical to this provision. Hence, interpretations 
should be made in accordance with customary rules of interpretation only,  without adding to or 
diminishing the rights and obligations of the parties. Here, WTO law is not granted explicit 
relevance for interpretation. 
 
Third, the DCFTAs with Georgia and Moldova require RTA dispute settlement organs to take 
into account the panels’ and AB’s interpretation of WTO law. Articles 265 EU-Georgia DCFTA 
and 401 EU-Moldova DCFTA read: 
“The arbitration panel shall interpret the provisions [of Title V (Trade and Trade-
related Matters) of this Agreement] in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law, including those codified in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. The arbitration panel shall also take into account 
relevant interpretations established in reports of panels and the Appellate Body 
adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).” 
 
Two possible situations emerge in interpreting the EU RTAs’ services chapters: (i) either 
provisions in the RTA are identical to a GATS provision, or (ii) they are not identical to a GATS 
                                               
27
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provision. This in turn raises three questions: (i) what is an ‘identical obligation’; (ii) should RTA 
arbitration panels deviate from WTO case law; and (iii) is there an influence of EU law on RTA 
provisions that is relevant for treaty interpretation? 
 
1.2.1 An ‘identical obligation’ 
It must first be determined what constitutes an ‘identical obligation’ in the sense of the treaty 
interpretation provisions of the EU-Korea, EU-Central America, EU-Singapore and EU-Ukraine 
RTAs. There does not appear to be a textual basis for limiting the meaning of ‘identical 
obligation’ to those obligations that are identically phrased to the corresponding GATS 
obligation. Rather, the interpretational rule extends to substantively identical obligations. It has 
been remarked that “when RTA negotiators seek language to which both/all parties are 
comfortable with, WTO language often provides a convenient ‘model’ or yardstick which is 
acceptable.”28 However, the fact that language is borrowed from GATS does not necessarily 
indicate that the substance of the obligation is the same. A few examples may highlight the 
limits to such an approach. First, Articles 7.5 EU-Korea RTA, 170 EU-Central America RTA, 8.5 
EU-Singapore RTA and 93 EU-Ukraine DCFTA each contain a market access obligation for 
cross-border trade in services that is phrased in a very similar way to Article XVI:1 and 2 (a)-(c) 
GATS. The differences in text are minor, e.g. in the example of the EU-Korea RTA “adopt or 
maintain” versus “maintain or adopt”, “the requirement of an economic needs test” versus “the 
requirements of an economic needs test”. It would seem that the obligation in this example is 
identical regardless of the slightly different wording. 
 
Second, the national treatment obligation for cross-border trade in services contained in Articles 
7.6 EU-Korea RTA, 171 EU-Central America RTA, 8.6 EU-Singapore RTA and 94 EU-Ukraine 
DCFTA is again formulated in almost identical wording as Article XVII GATS. However, the 
scope of Articles 7.6 EU-Korea RTA and 94 EU-Ukraine DCFTA may differ from that of Article 
XVII GATS. The national treatment obligation in the former only applies to sectors in which 
specific market access commitments have been scheduled,29 as the EU schedule in the 
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19 
 
agreement only contains one column and not three (market access, national treatment and 
additional commitments) as is the case for GATS. Hence, the relationship between the market 
access and national treatment obligations in the EU-Korea RTA and EU-Ukraine DCFTA may 
differ from that in GATS, in which the structure of the Members’ Schedule and Article XX:2 
GATS attempt to delineate between both obligations (although there is still substantial confusion 
on this delineation). Equally, the Schedules in the EU-Central America and EU-Singapore RTAs 
contain one column, merging national treatment and market access limitations, but do not 
explicitly state that national treatment only applies to sectors in which market access 
commitments have been scheduled. This may not have any practical importance, but this latter 
approach appears to be clearer. Similarly, the interpretative footnote 10 to Article XVII GATS 
has been added to the national treatment obligation in the three RTAs as a fourth paragraph. It 
is unclear whether this leads to the conclusion that Articles 7.6 EU-Korea RTA, 171 EU-Central 
America RTA, 8.6 EU-Singapore RTA and Article 94 EU-Ukraine DCFTA are not ‘identical’ to 
Article XVII GATS, but such a conclusion is clearly not inconceivable. 
 
Third, Article 7.8 EU-Korea RTA contains an MFN obligation for cross-border trade in services 
which is worded similarly but phrased differently to Article II GATS.30 The GATS Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN) obligation requires each Member to accord immediately and unconditionally to 
services and service suppliers of any other Member, treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country. The EU-Korea MFN 
obligation, however, requires the same treatment only insofar as the more favourable treatment 
is granted in the context of an economic integration agreement signed after the entry into force 
of the EU-Korea RTA, and only insofar as the treatment is not granted under sectoral or 
horizontal commitments for which the regional economic integration agreement stipulates a 
significantly higher level of obligations than the commitments in the EU-Korea RTA. Although 
the rationale behind and wording of both provisions is very similar, the provisions differ in their 
scope and effect. However, it can still be questioned whether the obligation is identical in a strict 
sense. As these examples indicate, an analysis of the substance of a provision, which takes into 
account its language, but also the context and other interpretative tools, must be made on a 
case-by-case basis.  
 
                                               
30
 Article 7.14 EU-Korea contains an identical MFN obligation for establishment. 
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The EU-Colombia & Peru and EU-Singapore RTAs do not contain an MFN obligation in their 
services chapters. Article 88.2 EU-Ukraine DCFTA provides an integrated MFN and national 
treatment obligation for establishment, but not for cross-border trade in services. 
 
1.2.2 The case for WTO consistent interpretation 
The second question arising from the interpretational provisions in the selected EU RTAs is 
whether provisions in the RTAs should be interpreted in conformity with WTO interpretations. 
Based on the overview above, there are four main avenues for interpretation:  
a. an identical obligation is interpreted ‘in consistency with’ WTO case law;  
b. an obligation, whether identical or non-identical, is interpreted by ‘taking into account’ 
WTO case law;  
c. a non-identical obligation is interpreted in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation; and  
d. an identical obligation is interpreted in accordance with customary rules of interpretation.  
At first sight, from a. to d., the risk of interpretational variance augments. Considering that WTO 
treaty interpretation is based on customary rules of interpretation, and that there is leeway within 
these rules for a different approach to the one taken in WTO dispute settlement practice, how 
far can RTA arbitration panels deviate from WTO treaty interpretation in situations b., c. or d.? A 
director at the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission noted, in his personal 
capacity, that 
“The complexity of finding an ‘ideal’ situation to the relationship between WTO and 
bilateral dispute settlement procedures is due to the fact that the substantive law of 
free trade agreements is very largely influenced—and, indeed, dependent upon—
WTO law.”31 
 
1.2.2.1 The presumption of WTO consistent interpretation 
For the three main reasons set out below, it is argued that there is a rebuttable ‘presumption’ 
that arbitration panels should interpret RTA provisions in consistency with WTO case law 
interpretations. This approach would improve the predictability and coherence of international 
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trade law, and is therefore “highly desirable”.32 Despite no direct legal obligation to follow WTO 
interpretations, RTA arbitration panels should apply a mild form of ‘de facto stare decisis’ (i.e. 
the doctrine of precedent), in which precedents are “followed for extra- and quasi-legal reasons, 
including custom and habit, and not as a matter of legal requirement.”33 In other words, in the 
case of these RTAs, the arbitration panels should heed WTO jurisprudence.34 However, it is 
sufficient for our purposes that the precedents are non-binding but highly persuasive.35 Such a 
“de facto precedent, like a de jure one, creates a presumption that it is to be followed unless a 
very good reason for a departure exists.”36 Hence, although RTA arbitration panels cannot 
expressly draw upon WTO case law if the RTA’s rules of interpretation only allow the panel to 
interpret in the light of principles of customary international law, a de facto identical outcome can 
and should be reached by following the WTO dispute settlement organ’s interpretational 
argumentation, which itself is based on customary principles of treaty interpretation. This follows 
the “call for the "awareness" by jurisdictions and adjudicators of others' jurisdictions”, based on 
“the general principle of good faith and principles of interpretation”.37 In the words of the main 
proponent of de facto stare decisis: 
“in a de facto stare decisis regime, a prior holding is like a cane that the adjudicator 
is only in theory – specifically, legal theory – free to use or toss, but in fact always 
uses whenever the opportunity arises, or in the rare cases when it chooses to toss 
the cane, it takes great care in explaining why.”38 
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1.2.2.2 Supremacy of the WTO agreements 
The first reason to interpret RTA provisions in consistency with WTO case law is based on the 
alleged supremacy of the WTO agreements vis-à-vis RTAs. Article 41.1 VCLT addresses 
situations in which two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement 
to modify the treaty as between themselves as individual parties. Article 41 VCLT is not 
considered to be customary international law as such but it is said that the principle embodied in 
the article “reflects customary law.”39 The provision allows such modification in two situations. 
First, in subparagraph (a), if the possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty, 
and second, in subparagraph (b), if the possibility of such a modification is not prohibited by the 
treaty. In the latter case, two additional requirements need to be fulfilled. First, the modification 
does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the 
performance of their obligations. Second, the modification does not relate to a provision from 
which derogation is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the 
multilateral treaty as a whole. According to two authors, the WTO rules on the formation of 
RTAs, in casu Article V GATS, are to be considered superior to RTA rules on the basis of Article 
41.1 (a) VCLT as the formation of the RTA is only in accordance with this provision if it respects 
the rules set out by Article V GATS.40 This creates a “constitutional and hierarchical relationship 
between WTO rules and RTAs”.41 The argument is in se limited to compliance with Articles 
XXIV GATT 1994 and V GATS. However, it may be questioned whether Article 41.1 (a) VCLT 
should be applied: does Article V GATS indeed provide for the possibility of modification?42 
Although arguably the case, in our view, it may equally be argued that subparagraph (b) is 
applicable. The modification is neither expressly prohibited, nor expressly allowed. Article V 
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GATS is an exception43 and therefore not explicitly a provision allowing modification of GATS 
between the RTA parties (even if in effect this is what an RTA does). If that is the case, the RTA 
should fulfil the two conditions contained in the provision.44 The first condition requires that the 
rights of the other Members are not prejudiced by the RTA. That would appear to be the case. 
In principle, the RTA remains res inter alios, i.e. a matter between the parties to the RTA, for 
those Members.45  
 
The second condition is more interesting: it requires that the effective execution of the object 
and purpose of GATS as a whole is not frustrated by the modification of a certain provision. The 
Panel in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products referred to the expansion of trade in 
services under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalisation and as a means of 
promoting the economic growth of all trading partners and the development of developing 
countries as the “general object and purpose” of GATS.46 A case can be made that RTAs do not 
necessarily contribute to this object and purpose, for example because they do not promote the 
interests of all WTO Members nor contribute to progressive rounds of multilateral services 
liberalisation. However, this is irrelevant to the question at hand, where it should be asked 
whether interpretations that are not consistent with GATS case law frustrate the object and 
purpose of GATS. Here, it may be argued that the establishment of a multilateral framework for 
trade in services, with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency 
and progressive liberalisation, could be hampered by inconsistent interpretations between RTAs 
and GATS, if not frustrated entirely. 
 
1.2.2.3 Systemic integration 
The second reason for interpreting provisions of RTAs in consistency with WTO case relates to 
the principle of systemic integration. Article 31.3 (c) VCLT requires the RTA arbitration panel to 
take into account, together with the context of the terms of the treaty and the treaty’s object and 
purpose, “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” 
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The AB noted that ‘relevant’ means concerning the subject matter at issue.47 According to the 
International Law Commission (ILC)’s report on fragmentation of international law, this rule 
expresses the principle of ‘systemic integration’.48 The ILC notes that:  
“None of this predetermines what it means to “confront” a norm with another or how 
they might enter into “concurrence”. These matters must be left to the interpreter to 
decide in view of the situation. The point is only - but it is a key point - that the 
normative environment cannot be ignored and that when interpreting the treaties, 
the principle of integration should be borne in mind. This points to the need to carry 
out the interpretation so as to see the rules in view of some comprehensible and 
coherent objective, to prioritize concerns that are more important at the cost of less 
important objectives. This is all that article 31 (3) (c) requires; the integration into the 
process of legal reasoning - including reasoning by courts and tribunals - of a sense 
of coherence and meaningfulness. Success of failure here is measured by how the 
legal world will view the outcome.”49 
The AB endorsed this interpretation in the context of applying non-WTO law to interpret WTO 
law.50 If the WTO agreements are applicable in the relations between the parties, i.e. all parties 
are WTO Members, and the rule concerns the same subject matter, RTA arbitration panels 
should take into account these rules and, hence, their interpretation by WTO dispute settlement 
bodies. The arbitration panels are only obliged to do so in specific situations according to the 
treaty interpretation provisions in the EU RTAs, but should take into account the normative 
environment of international trade law. In our view, ignoring WTO case law would run counter to 
the principle of systemic integration. Similarly, it may be said that WTO case law provides 
context in the sense of Article 31 VCLT.51 According to Article 38.1 (d) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, judicial decisions may also be subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law, although Article 59 of the Statute explicitly states that decisions of 
the court are not binding precedents. 
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1.2.2.4 Pragmatic reasons 
The third reason is a pragmatic preference for the multilateral dispute settlement organs in the 
context of the fragmentation of international trade law. In comparison to the body of case law 
from any other international tribunal, the WTO body of case law is both very substantial and 
well-developed. Therefore, it also has “procedural superiority” over RTA dispute settlement.52 
Multilateral dispute settlement may even be “intrinsically superior to RTA dispute settlement” 
and perceived as more legitimate because of, among others, neutrality of panellists and its 
rules-based approach.53 When confronted with the interpretation of provisions which are related 
to—not just identical to— WTO law, or find their foundation therein, there would be little sense 
for an ad hoc EU RTA arbitration panel to go against WTO case law interpretation, unless there 
is a clear indication that the parties intended to diverge from the meaning of the WTO provision. 
If an RTA has a telos similar to that of the WTO, the RTA’s dispute settlement mechanism “will 
be inspired by the GATT/WTO case law when interpreting” the RTA.54 Of course, the RTA panel 
should not apply WTO law, but it should use relevant WTO (case) law to interpret an RTA 
provision if the conditions of Article 31.3 (c) VCLT are fulfilled.55 In the case of the quasi-
universal membership to the WTO, the rule will only need to be ‘relevant’. 
 
Moreover, only in very specific cases can a WTO panel decline to exercise procedurally validly 
established jurisdiction.56 Otherwise, according to Article 23 DSU, the jurisdiction of the WTO 
dispute settlement system is exclusive and compulsory as concerns the covered agreements. 
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Hence, a Member may, in many cases, bring a case before the WTO if it is dissatisfied by the 
outcome at the level of RTA dispute settlement. For example, there is an overlap between WTO 
and NAFTA provisions and the latter’s dispute settlement mechanism has adjudicated on issues 
that could have been brought before a WTO panel.57 It has been argued that this does not 
conflict with the principles of res judicata (i.e. a matter already decided that cannot be brought 
again) or lis pendens (i.e. a pending matter) since at the very least the applicable law differs.58 
However, the risk of fragmentation and turf wars resulting from such a situation is not beneficial 
to any of the parties involved.59 Only in cases where the dispute is based on a WTO+ (i.e. (i.e. 
obligations found in a WTO agreement but going further than their WTO counterpart) or WTO-X  
(i.e. an obligation not found in a WTO agreement but related to the subject matter of such an 
agreement) provision, or in cases where a panel could decline to exercise its jurisdiction, would 
this risk not arise. 
 
1.2.2.5 Rebutting the presumption 
Lastly, as noted, the ‘presumption’ of interpreting EU RTA provisions consistently with WTO 
case law is rebuttable. Of course, the RTA interpreter is not stringently bound by WTO 
interpretations. The RTA is a separate treaty so its interpretation should not blindly or slavishly 
follow WTO case law.60 An RTA perhaps has its individual structural bias.61 The WTO 
agreements do not contain a statement of supremacy.62 If the outcome of applying the relevant 
rules of interpretation is that the provisions of the RTA should be interpreted differently than that 
indicated by a WTO case law, the interpreter should follow this course. Two situations 
immediately come to mind. First, the context, object and purpose of the agreements may differ, 
which may lead to a difference in interpretation—as is the case in the national treatment 
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 On the risks of and problems with forum shopping in this context, see Busch, ‘Overlapping Institutions, Forum 
Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade’. 
58
 Kwak and Marceau, ‘Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the World Trade Organization and Regional 
Trade Agreements’ 103; Davey and Sapir, ‘The Soft Drinks Case: The WTO and Regional Agreements’ 14 (on res 
judicata). 
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 Hsu, ‘Applicability of WTO Law in Regional Trade Agreements: Identifying the Links’ 541. 
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 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in WTO Law (Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper 08-02, 2008) 9. 
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 Armand C M de Mestral, ‘Dispute Settlement Under the WTO and RTAs: An Uneasy Relationship’ (2013) 16 
Journal of International Economic Law 777, 809-810. 
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obligations of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and 
III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994).63 Second, there may be an 
indication that the use of a different term suggests a different interpretation from a WTO term. 
However, if there is no such indication, or it is insufficient, preference should be given to 
interpretation in conformity with WTO law. This analysis needs to be made on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into account all relevant factors, but could be based on Article 31.4 VCLT type 
exceptions to the general principle of interpretation in accordance with the ordinary meaning of 
the text of a treaty.64 This provision states that a special (as opposed to ordinary) meaning—in 
this case a special meaning is a meaning different from WTO law—shall be given to a term if it 
is established that the parties so intended. 
 
If the presumption is rebutted, the question arises as to whether there should be coherence 
between the non-WTO compliant interpretations given to provisions in different RTAs. It is 
submitted that this is not the case if the treaty interpretation mechanisms do not support such a 
finding. For example, one of the objectives of the EU-Georgia DCFTA is the integration of the 
Georgian economy into the EU internal market while the EU-Colombia & Peru RTA appears to 
be concerned more with a GATS-type balance between trade liberalisation and other concerns. 
It would thus seem defensible that treaty provisions in these agreements are interpreted 
differently. 
 
2. The case studies 
Based on the mapping of services commitments in EU RTAs—which concludes that it is most 
relevant to assess ‘new generation’ RTAs—and the typology for EU RTA interpretation—in 
which three relevant options arise—, the following agreements are selected as case studies for 
the analysis of constraints on regulatory autonomy from the preferential liberalisation of trade in 
services: 
a. from the group of the EU-Korea RTA, the EU-Central America RTA or the EU-Singapore 
RTA, the selected case study is the EU-Singapore RTA. The agreement is the most 
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 See e.g. United States - Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes WT/DS406/AB/R, AB 
report adopted 24 April 2012 para. 181. 
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 Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 31’ in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Springer 2012) 568. 
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recent of these three agreements and moreover, as concerns services, constitutes the 
most important one from an economic point of view;65 
b. from the DCFTAs, the EU-Georgia DCFTA, the EU-Moldova DCFTA or the EU-Ukraine 
DCFTA, the selected agreement is the EU-Georgia DCFTA. These agreements are 
likely to be very similar, but total trade in services in Georgia is twice as large in 
comparison to Moldova. At the time of writing, July 2014, the text of the EU-Ukraine 
DCFTA was not yet available.66 
Interestingly, both Georgia and Singapore are examples of “the few countries in the 
world that has chosen a radical unilateral free trade opening of its economy to the whole 
of the world.”67 Consequently, both Georgia and Singapore can be expected to have had 
a ‘constraining’ impact on the negotiations, are they would have been looking for 
relatively unfettered liberalisation;68 
c. from the group of the EU-CARIFORUM RTA or the EU-Colombia & Peru RTA, the 
selected RTA is the latter. The EU originally negotiated the agreement with the Andean 
Community, which also includes Bolivia and Ecuador. At the time of writing, the EU and 
Ecuador concluded negotiations on Ecuador joining the RTA. Consequently, aside from 
being more recent agreements, the RTA may evolve into a full-fledged EU-Andean 
Community RTA. Considering that EU trade in goods with the Andean Community is 
three times as large as with the CARIFORUM states, the economic relevance of the 
Andean Community for services is likely to be larger as well.69  
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 The EU exported 16.6 billion € of services to Singapore in 2012, and imported 12 billion € worth of services from 
Singapore. EU services exports to Korea amounted to 9.6 billion € in 2012, imports were 4.6 billion €. No data on 
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Consequently, the three case studies analysed in this report are the EU-Singapore RTA (EU-
Singapore), the EU-Georgia DCFTA (EU-Georgia) and the EU-Colombia & Peru RTA (EU-
C&P). 
B. THE STRUCTURAL FLEXIBILITY OF THE SELECTED EU RTAS 
An important aspect in the context of regulatory autonomy is the structural flexibility of services 
disciplines. The structure of the services chapters of the EU-Colombia & Peru RTA, the EU-
Singapore RTA and the EU-Georgia DCFTA differs from that of GATS. The following two 
elements are relevant: the structure of obligations and the scheduling approach. 
 
1. Flexibility in the structure of obligations 
A notable difference between the three selected EU RTAs and GATS is the division of 
obligations in relation to the mode of supply. Whilst GATS obligations are the same for each 
mode, the RTAs contain separate obligations for establishment, cross-border supply of services 
and temporary presence of natural persons for business purposes. As discussed below, these 
categories correspond roughly to GATS Modes 3, 1 and 2, and 4 respectively. 
 
Additionally, the RTAs do not contain an MFN obligation, and consequently no MFN 
exemptions. The subsection on domestic regulation, contained in Articles 131 and 8.18-8.20 
respectively, is limited to sectors in which specific commitments have been undertaken. In the 
EU-Singapore RTA, it is added that the provision on domestic regulation only applies to the 
extent that the specific commitments apply. This appears to incorporate the reservations on 
specific commitments and consequentially render the domestic regulation provision a specific 
commitment rather than a conditional general obligation. 
 
2. Flexibility in scheduling specific commitments 
As with GATS, in the case of the EU-C&P and EU-Singapore RTAs, the market access and 
national treatment obligations only apply to committed sectors in the Schedule, and only insofar 
as they are not limited by reservations in that Schedule. In contrast to the integrated GATS 
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Schedules, the EU’s Schedules of specific commitments in the EU-C&P, EU-Singapore and EU-
Georgia agreements are divided in several Annexes.  
a. For the EU-C&P RTA, they are: (i) Annex VII Section B for establishment; (ii) Annex VIII 
Section B for cross-border trade in services; and (iii) Annex IX Appendix 1 Section B and 
Appendix 2 Section B for temporary presence of natural persons for business purposes.  
b. In the case of the EU-Singapore RTA, the commitments are listed under Annex 8 in (i) 
Appendix 8-A-1 for cross-border supply of services; (ii) Appendix 8-A-2 for 
establishment; and (iii) Appendix 8-A-3 for key personnel, graduate trainees and 
business services sellers.  
c. The specific commitments in the EU-Georgia DCFTA are listed in (i) Annex XIV-A for 
establishment; (ii) Annex XIV-B for cross-border supply of services; (iii) Annex XIV-C for 
key personnel, graduate trainees and business sellers; and (iv) Annex XIV-D for 
contractual services suppliers and independent professionals. 
Furthermore, the Schedules in the selected RTAs also differ structurally from GATS. Aside from 
the column setting out the relevant sector, they contain one70 and not three columns (market 
access, national treatment and additional commitments) as is the case for GATS. This approach 
may simplify the Schedule, and mitigate some uncertainty related to the application of Article 
XX:2 GATS. From the perspective of regulatory autonomy, this approach seems to preserve 
more policy space, as it would seem there is a presumption that the listed reservation applies to 
both market access and national treatment obligations in the case of uncertainty about the 
nature of the reservation. It would seem more difficult in this case, compared to the Article XX:2 
GATS situation, for a complainant to argue that the limitation only applies to market access 
issues and not national treatment.  
 
The situation differs in the case of the EU-Georgia DCFTA. The national treatment and MFN 
obligations for establishment apply to all services sectors within the scope of the chapter except 
for those situations covered by reservations in Annex XIV-A. In other words, for the first time in 
an EU RTA, and in contrast to the EU’s practice of using positive listing, a negative list approach 
was followed.71 This is also evident from the annex, as it differs from other Schedules by not 
being formatted in a column-type document. It merely contains a list of horizontal and sectoral 
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limitations. These limitations do not distinguish per se between national treatment and MFN. For 
regulatory autonomy, the negative listing approach means that any unlisted services are subject 
to the non-discrimination provisions, as are new services. The degree of liberalisation is 
therefore higher, although it may be said that legal certainty is increased as well. Interestingly, 
the DCFTA contains no market access obligation for this mode of supply. In the absence of 
such a market access obligation, for which a violation does not require the demonstration of 
discrimination, this approach may be more deferent to regulatory autonomy. A government is 
allowed to regulate as it pleases, insofar that it does not discriminate either between different 
foreign, or between foreign and domestic, services or services suppliers. For cross-border 
supply of services such an obligation has been added, but no MFN obligation applies. The 
national treatment and market access obligations only apply to scheduled sectors, consequently 
following a positive listing approach, and are limited by the reservations in Annex XIV-B. This 
annex does follow the traditional EU Schedule form with two columns. 
 
The domestic regulation provisions in Articles 93-95 mirror the division between the modes of 
supply. For cross-border supply of services, the obligation applies only to scheduled sectors and 
only to the extent that these specific commitments apply in accordance with Annex XIV-B. In the 
case of establishment and temporary stay of natural persons, the disciplines on domestic 
regulation shall not apply to sectors to the extent that a reservation is listed in accordance with 
Annexes XIV-A, C and D. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the scope of application of the most relevant obligations in the services chapters 
of the EU-Colombia & Peru and EU-Singapore RTAs is limited to services listed in the 
Schedule. In comparison to GATS, there are no core unconditional obligations (aside from e.g. 
the transparency obligation in Articles 130 EU-C&P and 8.17 EU-Singapore RTA). The lack of 
an MFN obligation and list of exemptions thereto, make the structure of the chapter more 
comprehensible. The structure of the services chapter in the EU-Georgia DCFTA thus differs 
substantially from that of GATS and of the other EU RTAs. It is a hybrid positive-negative listing 
chapter, with several flexibilities typical of trade in services. However, the hybrid approach in 
combination with the mode-specific obligations creates a complex structure that does not seem 
to offer greater flexibility.  
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C. THE SCOPE OF THE SELECTED EU RTAS FOR TRADE IN SERVICES 
The scope of the services chapters of the selected EU RTAs differs from that of GATS. This is 
unsurprising considering the greater possibility of excluding specific services sectors in bilateral 
talks compared to multilateral negotiations. Hence, although the scope of the services chapters 
in the selected EU RTAs remains very broad, it is nonetheless more limited than the scope of 
GATS. 
 
1. A wider scope 
The scope of the services chapters of the selected EU RTAs is defined similarly to that of 
GATS, but with distinct differences. In comparison to GATS, the emphasis lies on a 
differentiation based on the modes of supply, and, as a result hereof, the term ‘affecting’ and its 
alternatives. 
 
1.1 ‘Services’ and ‘supply of services’ 
Articles 108 EU-C&P and 77.12 EU-Georgia, which are carbon copies of Article I:3 (b) GATS, 
describe ‘services’ as any service in any sector, except services supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority. Similarly, ‘supply of a service’, described in Article 108 EU-C&P in the 
exact terms of Article XXVIII (b) GATS, includes the production, distribution, marketing, sale and 
delivery of a service. The EU-Singapore RTA contains no such description of services, although 
the definition of ‘supply of a service’ is included in Article 8.2 (j). 
 
1.2 Modes of supply 
1.2.1 Establishment 
A crucial formal difference between the selected EU RTAs and GATS is the approach to modes 
of supply of services.72 Articles 110 EU-C&P and 77.9 (a) EU-Georgia define ‘establishment’ as 
any type of business or professional establishment in any productive economic activity relating 
to the production of goods and supply of services through (i) the constitution, acquisition or 
maintenance of a juridical person (including capital participation for lasting economic links); or 
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 Although Article 8.2 (m) EU-Singapore RTA substantively replicates Article I:2 GATS in explaining the modes of 
supply, it’s chapter on cross-border trade in services nonetheless covers both Modes 1 and 2, as noted in Article 8.4 
of the RTA.  
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(ii) the creation or maintenance of a branch or representative office for the purpose of 
performing an economic activity.73 This definition would be wider than that of GATS Mode 3, i.e. 
commercial presence. Under GATS, the purpose of the establishment must be the supply of a 
service. GATS only applies to measures affecting trade in services whilst Article 111 EU-C&P 
applies to all measures affecting establishment.74 Additionally, the title under which the chapter 
falls is titled ‘Trade in services, establishment and electronic commerce’, indicating trade in 
services does not completely cover establishment.75 This wider scope also explains why the 
definitions in the EU-C&P RTA and EU-Georgia DCFTA do not explicitly refer to Mode 3. As is 
the case in GATS, the disciplines cover both pre- and post-establishment phases,76 and include 
services originating in the territory of establishment but delivered in the territory of another 
Member. From the perspective of regulatory autonomy, this approach can perhaps be criticised. 
The scope of the chapter on establishment may have an impact that is unexpected considering 
the commonplace equivalence of the terms ‘Mode 3’, ‘commercial presence’ and ‘establishment’ 
in the context of trade in services. 
 
Additionally, Article 77.9 (b) EU-Georgia adds that establishment also includes the right of 
natural persons to pursue economic activities as self-employed persons or by setting up 
undertakings which they effectively control. This addition further widens the scope of the 
establishment provisions in the agreement in two ways. First, including economic activities 
pursued by self-employed persons partially broadens the scope to services covered by GATS 
Mode 4. The overlap with the RTA alternative to Mode 4, i.e. temporary presence of natural 
persons for business purposes, is limited because, as addressed below, the latter is limited to 
specific categories of natural persons. This approach is coherent with the right of establishment 
in EU law as provided for in Article 49 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). Second, the explicit inclusion of undertakings set up and controlled by natural persons 
in the definition of establishment points at the difficulties in differentiating between Modes 3 and 
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4: commercial presence often requires the presence of natural persons.77 In this case, it would 
seem that the entry of a natural person into a market, even with the intention of setting up an 
undertaking, precedes the setting up of the business. However, this situation would not be 
covered by GATS Mode 4, as it is more likely to be a matter of migration: at the moment of the 
crossing of the border, there is no ‘international’ service supply.78 Hence, it is submitted that 
GATS would not apply. (Additionally, the temporary nature of Mode 4 services supply would 
exclude this situation from its scope.) If the natural person moves back abroad and remains in 
control from outside the business’ location, the situation may be covered by GATS Mode 3, but 
probably only in a post-establishment phase. In the DCFTA, this situation is covered by the 
chapter on establishment. Lastly, and this applies to both aspects, the DCFTA goes further as it 
is not limited to the supply of services but includes any type of economic activity. 
 
Although, at first sight, an almost identical approach is followed in the EU-Singapore RTA, 
Article 8.8 (d) notes that the economic activity should include, but not be limited to, supplying a 
service. This qualification limits the scope of the chapter on establishment in comparison to that 
of the EU-C&P RTA. Indeed, the scope is—albeit through the use of different wording—de facto 
identical to that of GATS Mode 3 as a result of this requirement. 
 
1.2.2 Cross-border trade in services 
Articles 117 EU-C&P, 8.4 EU-Singapore and 77.14 EU-Georgia define cross-border supply of 
services as encompassing both Mode 1 and Mode 2 supply of services. Although no explicit 
reference to GATS is made, the introduction of these terms through the use of the terms ‘Mode 
1’ or ‘Mode I’ clearly indicates an intent to interpret this as GATS Modes 1 and 2, as defined in 
Article I:2 (a) and (b) GATS. Combining these two modes of supply into one is perhaps 
unsurprising , as difficulties have arisen in GATS scholarship when trying to distinguish between 
Modes 1 and 2.79  
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 Diana Zacharias, ‘Article I GATS’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feinäugle (eds), Max 
Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law: WTO - Trade in Services, vol 6 (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 53. 
78
 Paragraph 1 of the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement notes 
that it applies to measures affecting natural persons who are service suppliers of a Member in respect of the supply 
of a service. The latter condition would not be fulfilled in the example at hand. 
79
 This has led to the suggestion that both modes are to be read as one, or redefine Mode 2 so that it requires 
physical movement by the consumer. Zacharias, ‘Article I GATS’ 51. 
35 
 
1.2.3 Temporary presence of natural persons for business purposes 
The RTA alternative to GATS Mode 4 is ‘temporary presence of natural persons for business 
purposes’. The definitions applied to this mode of supply of services are very specific, setting 
out requirements for various categories of service suppliers to which the obligations apply. In 
the case of the EU-Colombia & Peru RTA and the EU-Georgia DCFTA, these are key 
personnel, graduate trainees, business service sellers, contractual service suppliers, 
independent professionals and short term visitors for business purposes. Definitions for these 
categories are inscribed in Articles 123 EU-C&P, 8.13 EU-Singapore and 88 EU-Georgia, 
corresponding largely with the definitions for Mode 4 in the EU’s GATS Schedule. The 
maximum duration of the stay of the natural person depends on the category. For example, 
graduate trainees for ICT from Colombia or Peru may remain in the EU for up to three years. 
This limited scope reflects the EU’s intention, as is also evident from its GATS commitments, to 
use Mode 4 primarily for highly-skilled workers.80 
 
The obligations on temporary presence in the EU-C&P RTA only apply to listed sectors for 
contractual service suppliers, independent professionals and short term visitors for business 
purposes as listed respectively in Articles 126.2-3, 127.2-3 and 128.1 EU-C&P. In the EU-
Georgia DCFTA, the obligations apply to sectors for which commitments (including reservations 
in separate Annexes) are made concerning establishment for key personnel and graduate 
trainees. For business sellers, commitments on cross-border service supply are also taken into 
account, again subject to specific reservations. A separate Schedule is provided for contractual 
service suppliers. In Articles 8.13-8.15 EU-Singapore, only (i) key personnel and graduate 
trainees and (ii) business service sellers are covered. The definitions of these categories are 
again specific, and are limited to sectors for which specific commitments on establishment (both 
categories (i) and (ii)) or cross-border supply of services (only category (ii)) are undertaken.  
 
1.2.4 Measures ‘adopted or maintained by a Party’, ‘affecting’ and ‘concerning’ 
A ‘measure’ in the context of the services chapters includes any measure by a Party in any kind 
of form.81 Articles 108 EU-C&P, 8.2 (f) EU-Singapore and 77.2 EU-Georgia reproduce Article I:3 
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(a) GATS in comprising measures from central, regional and local governments and authorities 
and non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by such governments and 
authorities. Articles 118 EU-C&P, 8.3 EU-Singapore and 83 EU-Georgia mirror GATS, as these 
provisions apply to measures of the parties ‘affecting’ cross-border service supply. Affecting 
should be interpreted identically here to Article I:1 GATS. Whereas GATS only refers to 
measures ‘by’ Members, Articles 111 EU-C&P, 8.9 EU-Singapore and 78 EU-Georgia on 
establishment apply to measures that are ‘adopted or maintained’, highlighting that the RTA 
disciplines are not merely standstill provisions. The practical consequence of this wording is 
limited, as the key GATS disciplines also apply to existing measures.82 Nonetheless, in 
combination with the potentially wide scope of the establishment chapters, as discussed in the 
previous section, this contributes to the forceful language of the establishment disciplines. 
Lastly, according to Articles 122 EU-C&P, 8.13 EU-Singapore and 88.1 EU-Georgia, all 
measures of a party ‘concerning’ entry and temporary stay of the specific categories of natural 
persons are excluded. The use of the term ‘concerning’ instead of ‘affecting’ would indicate a 
broader scope of these provisions.83 Considering the already broad interpretation granted to 
‘affecting’, it would seem defendable that even measures which, in principle, affect other modes 
of supply could also concern the entry and temporary stay of natural persons. For example, a 
measure that restricts cross-border trade in services may incentivise natural persons to cross 
the border in order to supply a service. Again, the scope of application is, as concerns this term, 
broader than under GATS. 
 
2. Exemptions from the scope 
2.1 Exemptions applicable to all modes of supply 
The chapters on trade in services and establishment are limited by several explicit exemptions: 
a. Articles 107.2 EU-C&P, 8.2 (d) EU-Singapore and 76.2 EU-Georgia exclude government 
procurement of services. Article 173 EU-C&P, 10.2 EU-Singapore and 142 EU-Georgia, 
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which set out the scope of the respective chapters on government procurement, do 
however include trade in services; 
b. Articles 107.3 EU-C&P, 8.2 (a) EU-Singapore and 76.3 EU-Georgia exclude subsidies or 
grants, including government-supported loans, guarantees and insurance. This 
exemption is notable considering the application of GATS to subsidies as measures 
affecting trade in services, insofar as specific commitments have been scheduled and no 
limitations are inscribed. This stresses the importance of subsidies as a policy 
instrument,84 including the use of discriminatory subsidies;85 
c. Articles 107.4 read together with 108 EU-C&P, 8.2 (b) EU-Singapore and 77.12-13 
exclude services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority. The same 
conditions apply as under Article I:3 (c) GATS to establish governmental authority.86 
Considering the identical wording, it is submitted that the interpretation of the 
governmental authority exception in the RTAs should be identical to the one proposed in 
the context of Article I:2 GATS.  
Annex VII Section B of the EU-C&P RTA, Appendix 8-A-2 of the EU-Singapore RTA and 
Annex XIV-A of the EU-Georgia DCFTA contain a public utilities limitation for 
establishment, which reads that “[e]conomic activities considered as public utilities at a 
national or local level may be subject to public monopolies or to exclusive rights granted 
to private operators.” Interpretative footnote 6 to Appendix 8-A-2 EU-Singapore states 
that : 
“Given that public utilities often also exist at the sub-central level, detailed 
and exhaustive sector-specific listing is not practical. To facilitate 
comprehension, specific footnotes in this list of commitments will indicate in 
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equally mentions governmental authority without informing a different interpretation. 
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an illustrative and non-exhaustive way those sectors where public utilities 
play a major role.” 
Footnote 201 to Annex VII Section B of the EU-C&P RTA includes an identical footnote 
to the latter, as does footnote 8 to Annex XIV-A of the EU-Georgia DCFTA. 
In the case of the EU-Singapore RTA, as is the case under GATS, the public utilities 
limitation does not apply to telecommunications and computer and related services 
according to footnote 7. This is replicated in footnote 8 to Annex XIV-A of the EU-
Georgia DCFTA, which is more elaborate and identical to the EU’s GATS limitation on 
public utilities. Hence, the public utilities limitation in the EU-C&P RTA is wider than that 
under GATS or under the EU-Singapore and EU-Georgia agreements, as it may also 
apply to telecommunications and computer and related services; 
d. Articles 107.6 EU-C&P, 8.4 EU-Singapore and 76.5 EU-Georgia exclude measures 
affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a party and 
measures regarding citizenship, residence or permanent employment, again as is the 
case under GATS. 
These horizontal exclusions are generally reminiscent of GATS, although the exclusion of 
subsidies and grants is an important novelty from the perspective of regulatory autonomy. This 
exclusion may be considered exemplary in the sense that it preserves regulatory autonomy to a 
considerable extent, without compromising on legal certainty and transparency vis-à-vis other 
parties, and, as noted, on efficiency. 
 
2.2 Specific exemptions per mode of supply 
Articles 111 (a)-(f) EU-C&P, 8.9 EU-Singapore and 78 EU-Georgia exempt several specific 
services sectors from the scope of the provisions on establishment, for example audio-visual 
services or services related to toxic waste. Articles 118 (a)-(c) EU-C&P, 8.3 EU-Singapore and 
83 EU-Georgia contain fewer exemptions for cross-border trade in services (but those listed are 
substantively identical to the exemptions on establishment). In comparison to GATS, bilateral 
agreements need only cater for the interests of the signatory parties. Hence, there is more 
potential to agree on excluding specific services from the scope of the agreement. In the case of 
GATS, a practically similar result could be achieved by not scheduling specific commitments 
and inscribing MFN exemptions (as the EU has done for audio-visual services, for example). 
The exclusion of specific services from the scope nonetheless provides greater legal certainty 
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and does not subject the services to any obligation at all—which is, as explained, not the case 
for GATS, where certain obligations apply unconditionally. 
 
From the perspective of regulatory autonomy, the importance of these exclusions is less 
systemically relevant than the horizontal exemptions. However, the EU’s ability to negotiate 
these exemptions in a bilateral context in which GATS+ (i.e. obligations found in GATS but 
going further than the GATS counterpart) obligations arise, is important as it allows (relatively) 
specific defensive interests to be addressed. As noted, the benefit is legal certainty. The clear 
disadvantage is a less comprehensive scope, especially vis-à-vis obligations which are useful 
for trade liberalisation purposes but are less intrusive upon regulatory autonomy. It would 
appear that the fragmentation in the international regulation of trade in services, which results 
from exempting specific services sectors, is to be discouraged for two reasons. First, the 
interests which lead to the exclusion of specific services may change over time, but the 
exemptions may not be renegotiated easily. Second, although specific situations may justify 
exemption, in most cases regulatory autonomy should be sufficiently preserved through the 
horizontal exemptions. For example, the goals of the ‘cultural exception’ for audio-visual 
services, i.e. the preservation of cultural pluralism, may well be achieved without excluding 
these services from the scope of the services chapters.87 
D. UNCONDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE SELECTED EU RTAS 
1. No unconditional Most-Favoured-Nation obligation 
The services chapters of the EU-C&P and EU-Singapore RTAs do not contain MFN obligations. 
Conversely, the EU-Georgia DCFTA does contain an MFN obligation in Article 79.2, which also 
contains a national treatment obligation. The obligation only applies to establishment. As noted, 
in contrast to general EU practice, the provisions on establishment in this agreement apply to 
commitments made on the basis of a negative list and therefore are not unconditional, contrary 
to the case under GATS. Its constraints on regulatory autonomy will therefore not be addressed 
in this report. 
 
                                               
87
 See Bregt Natens, ‘Chronicle of a Death Foretold? The Cultural Exception for Audio-Visual Services in EU Trade 
Negotiations’ (2014) 41 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367. 
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2. All transparency obligations are unconditional 
Rather unsurprisingly considering its purpose, the principle of transparency is equally present, in 
rather similar ways as compared to GATS, in the selected EU RTAs and their services chapters. 
In the preamble of the EU-Singapore RTA, the parties recognise “the importance of 
transparency in international trade to the benefit of all stakeholders.” This consideration is 
reminiscent of the GATS preamble in the sense that it combines the principle of transparency 
with the preamble’s inclusionary wording (“as a means of promoting the economic growth of all 
trading partners and the development of developing countries”). Additionally, Chapter 14 of this 
RTA solely addresses transparency. In contrast to its explicit position in the preamble of the EU-
Singapore RTA, the principle of transparency is not expressed in the preambles or objectives of 
the EU-C&P and EU-Georgia agreements. This does not mean that transparency is not 
considered important. Title X of the EU-C&P RTA contains provisions relating to transparency 
and administrative proceedings. Moreover, Article 287 EU-C&P contains a general obligation to 
cooperate in relevant bilateral and multilateral fora in order to increase transparency in trade-
related matters.88 In the EU-Georgia DCFTA, Chapter 12 is wholly dedicated to transparency.  
 
All transparency obligations in the selected EU RTAs apply unconditionally. In many cases, their 
application extends beyond trade in services. The three prongs of the principle of transparency 
as discussed in the previous report—i.e. requirements (i) to make information on trade related 
laws, regulations and policies publicly available; (ii) to notify (changes to) laws and regulations; 
and (iii) to ensure that laws and regulations are administered in a uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner—can also be applied to the provisions of the RTAs. As was the case with 
GATS, obligations that are part of the third prong have the most potential to constrain regulatory 
autonomy. Their unconditional nature amplifies such potential. 
 
2.1 The obligation to publish or make publicly available all relevant measures 
Although very similar to Article III:1-2 GATS, Articles 288.1 and 3 EU-C&P differ slightly from 
their GATS counterpart. The obligation under the RTA also requires prompt publication of all 
measures of general application relating to any matter covered by the agreement. Appropriate 
                                               
88
 Article 116 EU-C&P requires the parties to cooperate in order to promote “an environment attractive for reciprocal 
investment”, which includes the review of the investment legal framework, the investment environment and the flow of 
investments between the parties within five years of the entry into force of the RTA and at regular intervals thereafter. 
The language of this provision, heavily referring to investment rather than establishment as a mode of supply of 
services, is not surprising considering the scope of the establishment chapter in which it is listed. 
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notification to the WTO or publication on the party’s website fulfils the obligation. However, the 
obligation may equally be satisfied by making these measures available to interested persons 
only. Under the GATS regime, this is only the case if publication is not practicable. This does 
not necessarily require making the measures publicly available. Article 221.1 EU-Georgia, 
entitled ‘Publication’ and part of the title on trade, requires parties to make all relevant measures 
of general application promptly and readily available via an officially designated medium. 
Although the provision does not explicitly state the measure should be published, the addition of 
the phrase “in such a manner as to enable any person to become acquainted with them” 
(emphasis added) implies that publication would be required. In contrast, Article 14.3.1 EU-
Singapore, identical for the rest of the provision and also applicable to all of the agreement, 
states that interested persons and the other party should be able to become acquainted with the 
measures. In this case, it is argued that the obligation may be satisfied without public 
availability. 
 
The latter two RTAs contain some additional transparency requirements. Articles 221.1 (c) EU-
Georgia and 14.1 (c) EU-Singapore require sufficient time between publication and entry into 
force of such measures. Articles 221.2 EU-Georgia and 14.3.2 EU-Singapore asks parties to 
endeavour to publish in advance proposals for, or for amendments to, such measures of 
general application. For the former agreement, an exception to the latter obligations applies for 
duly justified cases including security or emergency issues. In the case of the latter, an 
exception applies whenever the measure is urgent.  
 
The obligations in all three RTAs are similar. The added requirements in the EU-Georgia and 
EU-Singapore agreements could raise issues, but these do not seem related to regulatory 
autonomy. Therefore, none of these obligations to publish or make publicly available all relevant 
measures of general application constrain regulatory autonomy in a foreseeable manner. 
 
2.2 The obligations to respond to information requests and establish enquiry and contact points 
Again, in a very similar sense to Article III:4 GATS, Article 130.1 (a) EU-C&P requires the 
parties to respond promptly to all requests by another party for specific information regarding 
any of its measures of general application or international agreements which relate to or affect 
trade in services, establishment and electronic commerce.89 Subparagraph (b) obliges parties to 
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 This is confirmed more generally in Article 290 EU-C&P. 
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establish one or more enquiry points to provide specific information to investors and services 
suppliers of another party, upon request, on all matters referred to in subparagraph (a). The 
enquiry points need not be depositories of laws and regulations and are listed in Annex X 
(Enquiry Points Regarding Trade in Services, Establishment and Electronic Commerce), which 
contains the address of the enquiry points in all EU Member States and for the designated 
section in the European Commission.  
 
Article 97.1 EU-Georgia contains the same obligation, although it applies generally to all matters 
pertaining to the agreement and the enquiry points only need to be notified to the other party. 
Article 222 of the agreement provides that contact points, which should respond to enquiries for 
information, need to be designated. The information granted by the contact point on any 
measure of general application that might affect the operation of the Title IV on trade is not 
legally binding, but the information must be provided promptly upon the request of a party. 
 
For the EU-Singapore RTA, Article 8.17 equally obliges the parties to respond promptly to 
requests for specific information on any measure of general application pertaining to trade in 
services and establishment. This article, part of the services chapter, also refers to Article 14.4, 
which is a more elaborate provision on enquiries and contact points. Its key elements are 
twofold. First, it requires the prompt provision of information and response to questions related 
to actual or proposed measures of general application that may affect the operation of the RTA, 
regardless of prior notification of the measure. The information is not legally binding and without 
prejudice to the consistency of the measure with the RTA. Second, the parties must establish or 
maintain appropriate mechanisms with the task of seeking to resolve problems effectively for 
interested persons of the other party. This applies to any problem that may arise from the 
application of a measure of general application. Notably, these processes should be easily 
accessible, time-bound, result-oriented and transparent. 
 
Although the obligations can be burdensome, especially as concerns the more detailed 
provisions in the EU-Singapore RTA, they cannot be said to restrict regulatory autonomy. The 
last-noted obligation can be said to be similar to the obligation to make available legal remedies, 
discussed next. 
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2.3 The obligations to make available legal remedies 
Articles 292 EU-C&P, 14.6 EU-Singapore and 224 EU-Georgia require the establishment or 
maintenance of judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose 
of the prompt review of trade-related administrative action. They are similar to the obligation to 
make available legal remedies in Article VI:2 GATS,90 although some differences in language 
are notable. Most importantly, instead of requiring potential remedies, Article 292 EU-C&P 
requires the tribunals or procedures to have the power to correct the administrative action. 
Article 14.6 EU-Singapore contains the same obligation but qualifies that the establishment or 
maintenance of the tribunals or procedures is subject to the party’s domestic laws. Moreover, it 
explains in interpretative footnote 1 to that provision that ‘correction’ “may include a referral back 
to the body that took such action for corrective action”. Again, these requirements seem unlikely 
to constrain regulatory autonomy. The provisions in all three agreements contain procedural 
requirements for the tribunals and procedures, for example related to the right of defence or the 
implementation of decisions. 
 
In addition to the obligation to make available legal remedies, Article 411 EU-Georgia, which is 
a stand-alone provision in the final chapter of the title on trade, also requires the parties to 
ensure that natural and legal persons of the other party have non-discriminatory access vis-à-
vis the party’s own nationals to the domestic competent courts and administrative organs to 
defend their individual rights. The EU-C&P and EU-Singapore RTAs do not contain a similar 
provision. This obligation appears to guarantee standing for Georgian complainants before 
European and Member States’ courts, insofar as such standing is granted to domestic 
complainants.  
 
2.4 Transparency obligations related to recognition 
Any agreement on mutual recognition that has been found consistent with the requirements set 
out by the RTA must, according to Articles 129.5 EU-C&P and 96.5 EU-Georgia, also be 
consistent with, in particular, Article VII GATS. Consequently, the transparency obligations of 
Article VII GATS analysed in the previous report of this research track are applicable to these 
RTAs mutatis mutandis (i.e. applicable in full, with the necessary textual changes to 
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 The unconditional nature of this obligation in the RTAs supports the position that the corresponding GATS 
provision is indeed not conditional. 
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accommodate for the different context).91 Although the EU-Singapore RTA also contains a 
provision on mutual recognition for services, the agreement does not include a reference to 
Article VII GATS. Nonetheless, its transparency provisions would apply in any case: not fulfilling 
the information requirements of Article VII GATS would violate GATS because these obligations 
apply to bilateral relations. Of course, in such a case, no RTA provision would be violated. As 
noted with regard to GATS, these transparency obligations do not constrain regulatory 
autonomy. 
 
2.5 The obligation to enter into consultations regarding competition matters 
The consultation obligation for ‘business practices’ set out in Article IX:2 GATS is elaborated in 
Article 12.13 EU-Singapore. It is part of the RTA’s Chapter 12 on ‘Competition and related 
matters’, and applies generally to matters concerning antitrust and mergers, public undertakings 
and undertakings entrusted with special or exclusive rights and state monopolies, confidentiality 
and cooperation, and coordination in law enforcement. The provision requires parties to (i) enter 
into consultations on any questions related to matters within the scope of the provision; and (ii) 
promptly discuss upon the request of the other party any questions related to the interpretation 
or application of Chapter 12. This provision is not a soft-consultations norm as found in Article 
IX GATS, but does not appear to constrain regulatory autonomy.  
 
In contrast to the EU-Singapore RTA, Article 265 EU-C&P merely requires a party to accept the 
initiation of consultations on issues related to competition, whilst according its fullest 
consideration to the concerns of the other party. Interestingly, the provision explicitly adds that 
the autonomy of the party being asked to enter into consultations is ‘fully maintained’ as 
concerns its final decision on the issue subject to the consultations. This appears to be an 
unnecessary safeguard, as the provision does not indicate otherwise.  
 
The EU-Georgia DCFTA does not contain a similar provision on consultations regarding 
competition matters. 
 
                                               
91
 These three obligations are (i) informing the WTO of existing recognition measures; (ii) promptly informing the 
WTO as far in advance as possible of the opening of negotiations on such an agreement or arrangement; (iii) 
promptly informing the WTO when it adopts new recognition measures or significantly modifies existing ones. 
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2.6 Transparency obligations related to subsidies 
As noted, Article XV GATS includes an obligation to exchange information regarding subsidies. 
Article 293.5 EU-C&P builds on this transparency provision, stating that the parties agree to 
exchange information upon the request of another party on matters regarding subsidies related 
to trade in services. As with Article XV GATS, the provision does not further specify the type of 
information that should be exchanged. Article 206 EU-Georgia, defining subsidies related to 
services with reference to the conditions set out in Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement),92 requires the prompt provision of 
information and response to questions pertaining to particular subsidies relating to trade in 
services. Hence, while stronger in wording, the scope of the obligation is more limited as it does 
not require general information exchanges. Article 12.9 EU-Singapore goes further than both 
other agreements. It requires each party to report biannually to the other party by means of a 
publicly available website on the legal basis, form, and to the extent possible, amount or budget, 
and the recipient of subsidies, including subsidies related to trade in services, granted by its 
government or any public body.93 Even in the case of the more stringent provisions in the EU-
Singapore RTA, these obligations do not constrain regulatory autonomy (with the caveat noted 
above). 
 
2.7 Reasonable, objective and impartial administration 
All three RTAs contain an unconditional obligation similar to the conditional GATS obligation to 
administer measures of general application in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. 
Article 131.1 EU-C&P is identical to Article VI:1 GATS, although it applies to all measures of 
general application covered by the title on trade in services, establishment and e-commerce as 
discussed above.  
 
Article 223.1 EU-Georgia is again substantively identical to its GATS counterpart but its scope 
of application covers the integral Title IV on trade. Moreover, in paragraph 2 of that provision, 
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 This is a practical approach also used in Gilles Gauthier, Erin O'Brien and Susan Spencer, ‘Déjà Vu, or New 
Beginning for Safeguards and Subsidies Rules in Services Trade?’ in Pierre Sauvé and Robert M Stern (eds), GATS 
2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (Brookings Institution 2000) 177. 
93
 The EU-Singapore RTA also contains substantive disciplines applying to subsidies for service suppliers in Articles 
12.5-12.10, which are discussed below. The same provision is listed in paragraph 3 of Article 206 EU-Georgia but 
applies solely to subsidies in relation to goods. 
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the obligation is further specified. These specific emanations require the parties, when applying 
measures of general application to particular services or service suppliers, to: 
a. ensure that the procedures a party applies are based on and carried out in accordance 
with that party’s law. This requirement gives foreign service suppliers the same 
guarantees as domestic service suppliers that domestic laws will be applied, although 
enforcement may be much simpler for domestic service suppliers (for example because 
of standing, or from a purely practical perspective); 
b. in the case of the initiation of administrative proceedings, endeavour to provide directly 
affected interested persons with a reasonable notice, a description of the nature of the 
proceeding, a statement of the legal authority under which the proceeding is initiated and 
a general description of any issues in controversy; 
c. afford such directly affected interested persons a reasonable opportunity to present facts 
and arguments before a final administrative action is undertaken, in so far as time, the 
nature of the proceeding and, notably, public interest will allow. 
The relationship between these specific emanations and the general principles of 
reasonableness, objectivity and impartiality is not entirely clear. As the specific emanations are 
preceded by the words ‘to this end’ the general principles are to be understood as not 
exclusively furthered through these specific emanations. They are merely explicit examples of 
what is covered by this obligation. 
 
Although Article 14.5 EU-Singapore strongly resembles Article 223 EU-Georgia from a 
substantive point of view, its structure is fundamentally different. The three specific emanations 
are also present in the former provision, in identical wording. However, instead of a general first 
paragraph that sets out the obligation to administer all measures of general application in an 
objective, impartial and reasonable manner, Article 14.5 EU-Singapore merely states that with a 
view of doing so, the three specified conditions must be fulfilled. Hence, it is argued that in 
contrast to the case under the EU-Georgia DCFTA, here the general principles of objectivity, 
impartiality and reasonableness are the objective of the three specified conditions, and do not 
contain an obligation in and of themselves. Consequently, the obligation is, perhaps 
surprisingly, more limited than is the case for the EU-C&P RTA and the EU-Georgia DCFTA. It 
could even be said to be GATS-.  
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Nonetheless, the provisions in all three RTAs do not constrain regulatory autonomy beyond the 
potential constraints from Article VI:1 GATS, and the interpretation of the three principles set 
forth in our analysis of the latter provision applies to these provisions mutatis mutandis. 
 
2.8 Information obligations related to authorisation for the supply of services 
Article 131.2 EU-C&P is identical to Article VI:3 GATS, but applies to the services and service 
suppliers covered by the wider definition of establishment in the agreement insofar as specific 
commitments have been scheduled and where authorisation is required. It is thus unconditional, 
in contrast to Article VI:3 GATS. Nonetheless, the obligation does not constrain regulatory 
autonomy. 
 
No parallel general obligation related to such authorisation can be found in the EU-Singapore 
RTA or the EU-Georgia DCFTA. These agreements do contain more elaborate provisions on 
authorisation in the specific context of licencing requirements and procedures and qualification 
requirements and procedures, discussed below. 
 
2.9 No requirement of adequate procedures to verify professional service suppliers’ competence 
There is no alternative to Article VI:6 GATS in any of the RTAs. In the EU-Singapore and EU-
Georgia agreements, the competence of natural persons, not explicitly limited to professional 
service suppliers, is linked to qualification requirements, discussed below. 
 
2.10 The obligation to provide an explanation of the objective and rationale for measures of 
general application, and to provide opportunities for comment 
Articles 14.3 EU-Singapore and 221 EU-Georgia contain a ‘GATS-X’ (i.e. an obligation not 
found in GATS but nonetheless related or applicable to trade in services) transparency 
obligation. These provisions require that Members provide an explanation of the objective of 
and the rationale for measures of general application.94 In the EU-Singapore RTA, this 
requirement only applies ‘to the extent possible’. It is argued that these conditions would be 
fulfilled in many cases by way of preambular considerations or general provisions in such 
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 This obligation is reminiscent of, but differs from, Articles 2.5 and 2.9.2 TBT Agreement, and Paragraph 5 (b) of 
Annex B to the SPS Agreement.. 
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measures of general application. Although its impact on regulatory autonomy is very limited 
because the objective and rationale of the measure themselves are of course not subject to 
requirements, this provision is nonetheless notable as it arguably externalises a form of 
procedural good governance.  
 
The EU-C&P RTA does not contain a similar provision. The closest it comes is in Article 288.2, 
which requires that each party, to the extent possible, shall provide opportunities for interested 
persons to comment on any proposed measure relating to any matter covered by the 
agreement, and shall examine such comments, provided they are relevant. This provision can 
also be found in Articles 221.2 (b)-(c) EU-Georgia and 14.3.2 (b)-(c) EU-Singapore.95 Again, 
such requirements do not constrain regulatory autonomy. 
 
3. One unconditional domestic regulation obligation 
In contrast to the case in Article VI:4-5 GATS and Articles 8.18-8.20 EU-Singapore and 93-95 
EU-Georgia, Article 131 EU-C&P on domestic regulation applies to all sectors, regardless of 
whether they are scheduled or not. However, the interpretation of this provision, which is 
substantively very similar to the aforementioned GATS provisions, is so dependent on that 
under GATS that it’s constraints on regulatory autonomy will not be addressed in this report. 
 
4. Obligations related to monopolies and exclusive service suppliers 
4.1 Competition-related obligations 
The services and establishment chapters of the EU-C&P, EU-Singapore and EU-Georgia RTAs 
do not contain specific obligations for monopolies or exclusive service suppliers. However, their 
respective Title VIII, Chapter 12 and Chapter 10 on competition do. The disciplines in these 
chapters apply to goods and services. 
 
In Article 263 EU-C&P, it is explicitly noted that nothing in the agreement shall prevent a party 
from establishing or maintaining public or private monopolies and state enterprises according to 
its domestic legislation. The terms public and private monopolies do not appear to include 
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 This obligation, too, is similar to those contained in Articles 2.9.1 and 2.9.4 TBT Agreement, and Paragraphs 5 (a) 
and (d) of Annex B to the SPS Agreement. 
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exclusive service suppliers because of the addition of the term ‘state enterprises’. In the context 
of Article XVII GATT 1994, state (trading) enterprises are defined as  
“governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, 
which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory 
or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their 
purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports.”96 
Paragraph 1(a) of the Ad Article XVII GATT 1994, in Annex 1 of the GATT 1994, further 
specifies that: 
“Governmental measures imposed to insure standards of quality and efficiency in 
the operation of external trade, or privileges granted for the exploitation of national 
natural resources but which do not empower the government to exercise control 
over the trading activities of the enterprise in question, do not constitute "exclusive 
or special privileges".” 
The application of this provision to goods implies that this definition can be applied a fortiori in 
the context of the EU-C&P RTA. Therefore, state enterprises would include exclusive service 
suppliers, both established or authorised by the government.97  
 
The parties must ensure that these companies are subject to its domestic competition laws. The 
content of these laws is not further specified and may thus be moulded to fit with domestic 
policy preferences. Additionally, with regard to state enterprises and designated monopolies, no 
party shall adopt or maintain any measure, contrary to the provisions of the competition title, 
which distorts trade and investment between the parties. Considering that these provisions 
mainly refer to the domestic competition laws, they do not constrain regulatory autonomy. 
 
In Article 205 EU-Georgia, it is again noted that the agreement does not prohibit the designating 
or maintaining of state monopolies or state enterprises, or entrusting enterprises with special or 
exclusive rights according to its domestic legislation. Considering the aforementioned definition 
of state enterprises, it is unclear why the third category of enterprises was added to the 
provision. The most likely reason seems to be avoiding discussion as to whether private, i.e. 
non-governmental, enterprises are covered by the term ‘state enterprises’. 
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 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 1994, para. 2. 
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 Both the text of Article XVII GATT 1994 and the AB distinguish state trading enterprises from private enterprises: 
Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain WT/DS276/AB/R, AB report 
adopted 27 September 2004 para. 149. However, this distinction is, in our opinion, between private enterprises that 
have been granted special or exclusive rights and private enterprises that do not. 
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State monopolies of a commercial character, state enterprises or enterprises that have been 
granted special or exclusive rights have to be subject to domestic competition laws insofar as 
this does not inhibit them in performing their tasks. Although this qualification is absent from the 
EU-C&P RTA, the domestic legislation may of course include specific clauses which safeguard 
the effective working of these undertakings. Nonetheless, it is a notable explicit inclusion, 
perhaps motivated by existing competition laws that did not contain specific rules for the 
relevant undertakings. As under the EU-C&P RTA, these obligations cannot be said to constrain 
regulatory autonomy as domestic competition laws may cater for any policy needs. The explicit 
limitation that defends the effective performance of the covered undertakings serves as an 
additional, but perhaps legally unnecessary, safeguard. 
 
The relevant disciplines in the EU-Singapore RTA are the most elaborate. Article 12.3 of the 
agreement once more notes that the agreement does not prevent a party from establishing or 
maintaining public undertakings, or entrusting undertakings with special or exclusive rights. 
State monopolies, further addressed in the subsequent article, are likely to fall within the scope 
of the term ‘public undertakings’, which would also encompass state enterprises. ‘Public’ 
exclusive service suppliers would do, too. Private monopolies or exclusive service suppliers 
would fall within the scope of the undertakings entrusted with special or exclusive rights. The 
scope of all three provisions is thus, although their wording differs, likely to be the same as 
concerns monopolies and exclusive services suppliers. The EU-Singapore RTA perhaps goes 
further, as all public undertakings, even if they have not been granted exclusive rights or 
privileges, are included. However, there may be few relevant public undertakings that do not fall 
within the scope of the term state enterprises. 
 
Again, the covered undertakings (regardless of the commercial character of state monopolies) 
have to be subjected to certain competition laws,98 insofar as this does not inhibit them in 
performing their tasks.99  
 
Furthermore, the EU-Singapore RTA provides that parties must ensure that undertakings 
entrusted with special or exclusive rights (but not public undertakings) do not use those rights to 
engage in anticompetitive practices in a different market to the one in which their special or 
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 Articles 12.1 and 12.2 EU-Singapore further elaborate on which laws apply. 
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 Article 12.3.2 EU-Singapore. 
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exclusive rights apply.100 The scope of the obligation is wide as it includes actions through those 
undertakings’ dealings with their parents, subsidiaries, or other undertakings with common 
ownership. It is limited in the sense that the anticompetitive practices are only prohibited if they 
adversely affect investments or trade in goods or services of the other party. This obligation 
again mitigates one of the shortcomings of Article VIII:2 GATS, which does not apply to such 
anticompetitive cross-subsidisation.101 The impact of this provision on regulatory autonomy is 
nonetheless limited in the same way as is the case in Article VIII GATS. It requires the adoption 
or maintenance of certain competition laws but would not preclude any policy, except for any 
policies aiming at anticompetitive cross-subsidisation. 
 
4.2 A non-discrimination obligation for state monopolies 
Article 12.4 EU-Singapore contains a specific obligation for state monopolies,102 for which no 
counterpart is included in the EU-C&P or EU-Georgia agreements. It reaffirms that nothing in 
the competition chapter shall be construed to prevent a party from designating or maintaining 
state monopolies. In our view, this statement is redundant as, as noted, state monopolies are 
covered by Article 12.3.1 of the agreement as well. Subsequently, it contains the obligation to 
“adjust state monopolies of a commercial character” to ensure that no discrimination occurs in 
(i) the procurement of goods and services from natural or legal persons of the other party and 
(ii) the marketing of goods and services to natural or legal persons of the other party. The 
commercial character is present—in accordance with the interpretation of ‘on a commercial 
basis’ in the context of the governmental authority exception—when the state monopoly 
supplies goods or services with a profit or with a long-term profit-seeking intention. (Notably, the 
governmental authority exception does not apply to this chapter.)  
 
Considering that the RTA includes government procurement disciplines that cover services, the 
first element of this obligation is not surprising.103 It does not constrain regulatory autonomy, 
except for the fact that domestic suppliers can no longer benefit from the procurement of the 
state monopolies. The second element is however unexpected. This is especially so because 
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the ordinary meaning of the term ‘marketing’ based on a dictionary definition is wide. Marketing 
is the: 
"aggregate of functions involved in transferring title and in moving goods from 
producer to consumer including among others buying, selling, storing, transporting, 
standardizing, financing, risk bearing and supplying market information."104 
State monopolies are thus subject to an unconditional national treatment-type non-
discrimination obligation for their marketing of services to natural or legal persons of the other 
party. This marketing to natural or legal persons should be read as providing non-discriminatory 
access to the service that is being supplied by the commercial state monopoly. For example, a 
state postal service monopoly with a commercial character cannot discriminate in its supply of 
postal services between domestic and foreign consumers of these services.  
 
This obligation is thus similar to Article VIII:1 GATS, although its scope is wider. First, it is not 
limited by specific commitments, limitations thereto or MFN exemptions. Second, it is not limited 
to the supply of the monopoly service. Third, the non-discrimination obligation is phrased in 
general terms, with a wider scope of application than the MFN or national treatment obligations 
under GATS. There is no requirement of less favourable treatment or a likeness condition. 
Therefore, its constraints on regulatory autonomy are more substantial. Nonetheless, these 
constraints remain limited as they only require governments to eliminate any discrimination from 
the supply of services by state monopolies with a commercial character. 
 
4.3 The EU Schedules of specific commitments 
As noted, there is no exclusion of monopoly or exclusive service suppliers from the scope of the 
services chapters of the EU RTAs, unless the governmental authority exception applies. 
Therefore, and taking into account the considerable attention devoted to the subject in the EU’s 
GATS Schedule, the scope of the specific commitments in the EU’s Schedules in the selected 
RTAs are important.  
 
It is notable that the horizontal ‘public utilities’ limitation is also inscribed in Annexes VII Section 
B EU-C&P and 8-A-2 EU-Singapore, which cover limitations for establishment. Its scope is 
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wider, as not only services but all economic activities may be covered.105 The structure of the 
Schedule, in which market access and national treatment limitations are listed in the same 
column, makes recourse to an Article XXI:2 GATS-type provision unnecessary to extend the 
limitation from market access to national treatment. The Schedule also contains sectoral 
limitations. These limitations are fewer than in the GATS Schedule, but all of the EU’s sectoral 
limitations in the EU-C&P and EU-Singapore RTAs are also scheduled under GATS. An 
exception, in both RTAs, is the maintenance and repair of rail transport equipment in Latvia, 
which is supplied by a state monopoly. For the EU-Singapore RTA, there are additional 
reservations for the distribution of pharmaceutical products and tobacco products, for pipeline 
transport for goods that are not fuel, and for passenger and freight transportation services in 
Austria, where exclusive rights and/or authorisations can only be granted to nationals or legal 
persons of the EU Member States. The latter limitation for passenger and freight transportation 
also applies to Bulgaria. 
 
Annexes VIII Section B EU-C&P and 8-A-1 EU-Singapore contain the commitments and 
limitations thereto for cross-border trade in services. Paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively, of the 
introductory note to the Schedules note that the commitments are “without prejudice to the 
existence of public monopolies and exclusive rights as described in the list of commitments on 
establishment.” The same applies to the ‘Mode 4’ specific commitments in paragraph 7 of the 
introductory note to Annex 8-A-3 EU-Singapore. The Schedules further replicate the Italian 
limitation for Mode 1 wholesale trade in tobacco services from the EU’s GATS Schedule. A 
limitation not contained in the GATS Schedule applies to publicly funded research and 
development services on natural sciences and interdisciplinary research and development 
services. For these services, exclusive rights and/or authorisations can only be granted to EU 
nationals or juridical persons.106 
 
As noted, the EU’s Schedule for establishment, contained in Annex XIV-A of the EU-Georgia 
DCFTA makes use of a negative list. The ‘public utilities’ exemption is replicated. This Annex 
further repeats the reservation for research and development services, although here it applies 
to all such services. The French limitation on tobacco retail also applies. A limitation not found in 
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GATS or the other RTAs allows Austria and Bulgaria to grant exclusive rights and/or 
authorisations only to nationals or legal persons of EU Member States for passenger and freight 
transportation services. 
 
For cross-border trade in services, a positive list is used (as is the case in GATS). In this regard, 
Annex XIV-B EU-Georgia again notes, in paragraph 4 of the introductory note, that the 
Schedule is without prejudice to the existence of public monopolies and exclusive rights as 
described in the list of commitments on establishment. (This is replicated for ‘Mode 4’ 
commitments in Annexes XIV paragraph 7 of the introductory note.) The publicly funded 
research and development limitation is listed for Modes 1 and 2, for social sciences, humanities 
and natural sciences. 
 
The EU-Georgia DCFTA thus contains fewer limitations for monopolies and exclusive service 
suppliers, although the use of a negative list could perhaps have indicated that more limitations 
would need to be scheduled to accommodate for the negative listing. As a consequence, there 
is, especially as concerns establishment, but equally insofar as fewer limitations are scheduled 
for cross-border trade in services, less room for manoeuvring for governments to establish or 
maintain monopolies or exclusive service suppliers. For example, the state monopoly on 
tobacco retailing services in GATS and the EU-C&P and EU-Singapore RTAs for Spain, France 
and Italy cannot be upheld under the EU-Georgia DCFTA. In the latter agreement, it is merely 
noted that for distribution services in tobacco, nationality requirements may apply to operate as 
a tobacconist. Therefore, regulatory autonomy is constrained by more extensive commitments 
in the EU-Georgia DCFTA vis-à-vis GATS and the other two agreements. 
 
5. Obligations related to the current and capital transactions 
The provisions addressing current and capital transactions in the selected EU RTAs are not part 
of the services chapters, but apply generally to trade. In the EU-C&P RTA and EU-Georgia 
DCFTA, they form Title V and Chapter VII respectively, entitled Current Payments and 
Movement of Capital.107 In the EU-Singapore RTA, two provisions address current and capital 
transactions. 
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For current transactions, Articles 168 EU-C&P and 17.7 EU-Singapore require the parties to 
authorise any payments and transfers on the current account of balance of payments between 
the parties, in freely convertible currency and in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of 
the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This obligation is 
unconditional, contrary to Article XI GATS, and therefore has a more sweeping scope than the 
GATS counterpart. The use of the term ‘authorise’ indicates that the payment may need to be 
approved,108 and thus is not automatic. This is notable considering prior EU practice, where the 
EU undertook the obligation to not ‘impose’ any restrictions on current payments for current 
transactions.109 Similarly, in Article 137 EU-Georgia, the parties “undertake to impose no 
restrictions and shall allow” current transactions in freely convertible currency and in accordance 
with Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement. This obligation goes further than the one in the 
EU-C&P and EU-Singapore RTAs. 
 
Interestingly, as concerns capital transfers, the EU-Singapore agreement only contains a 
consultation obligation with a view to facilitating the movement of capital between the parties.110 
Articles 169 EU-C&P and 138.1 EU-Georgia however oblige the parties to ensure the free 
movement of capital transactions relating to investments and other transactions made in 
accordance with the provisions of, inter alia, the services chapter, including the liquidation and 
repatriation of such investments and of any profit stemming therefrom. The obligation also 
applies to transactions related to the financial account of the balance of payments. The 
obligation is limited because a link between the substantive provisions of the RTA and the 
capital transaction appears to remain necessary. For the EU-C&P RTA, it is further limited by 
footnote 57, which elucidates that the exceptions clauses of the RTA shall apply to this Title of 
the agreement as well. 
 
The EU-Georgia DCFTA goes further, and adds in Article 138.2 that for transactions on the 
capital and financial account not covered by paragraph 1, each party shall ensure the free 
movement of capital (i) relating to credits for commercial transactions, (ii) for the provision of 
services in which a resident of one of the parties is participating, and (iii) relating to portfolio 
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investments, financial loans and credits by the investors of the other party. As a consequence, 
the link between the capital transaction and the agreement’s substantive provisions is no longer 
required. 
 
It is very difficult to evaluate the constraints on regulatory autonomy of these provisions without 
further in-depth analysis as to whether these concerns are not mitigated by specific financial 
services disciplines in the RTAs, by EU law or practice, and by the commitments that result from 
the IMF Articles of Agreement.111 As noted by one author, the provisions “lag behind the virtual 
free movement of capital and payments among parties [in casu of the Association Agreements 
between the EU and Mediterranean countries].”112 In comparison to GATS, it is notable that the 
relevant provisions in the selected RTAs are not conditional upon specific commitments but 
apply generally. For current transactions, this wider scope is mitigated in the EU-C&P and EU-
Singapore RTAs as the EU may still require the authorisation of payments. In the EU-Georgia 
DCFTA, no restrictions may be imposed. Interestingly, the EU-Singapore RTA does not contain 
disciplines for capital transactions while the EU-C&P and EU-Georgia agreements’ scope in this 
matter is extended to transactions on the financial account. Lastly, confirming that the EU-
Georgia DCFTA has the most stringent disciplines at hand, this agreement also applies to 
capital transactions that are not linked to substantive provisions of the DCFTA. 
 
6. Unconditional GATS-X disciplines 
6.1 Competition 
As noted, competition policy is one of the Singapore Issues:113 limited competition and anti-
competitive practices have the potential to distort the proper operation of markets and may 
undermine the benefits of trade liberalization arising from trade agreements.114 Article IX is the 
only GATS provision addressing the issue. The EU has therefore addressed competition, 
including but not limited to trade in services, in its RTAs. 
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Articles 258-262 EU-C&P form Title VIII on competition policy. Notably, the parties may not 
have recourse to dispute settlement on the basis of these provisions.115 The main obligation of 
the section is enshrined in Article 259.2 EU-C&P, which states the parties agree that three types 
of practices are inconsistent with the agreement insofar as they affect trade: 
a. any agreement, decision, recommendation or concerted practice, which has the purpose 
or effect of impeding, restricting, or distorting competition in accordance with domestic 
competition law; 
b. the abuse of a dominant position in accordance with domestic competition law; and  
c. concentrations of companies which significantly impede effective competition in 
accordance with domestic competition law. 
The parties must support and promote measures to strengthen competition in their respective 
jurisdictions in accordance with the objectives of the RTA. As concerns domestic competition 
law, Article 260 requires parties to (i) maintain competition laws and adopt appropriate actions; 
and (ii) maintain or establish competition authorities for the effective enforcement of the 
competition laws. It is expressly stressed that each party maintains its autonomy to establish, 
develop and implement its own competition policies. In case a party considers that any of the 
three aforementioned prohibited practices in the other party has an adverse effect on trade 
relations, it may request that enforcement activities established under the host country’s 
domestic competition legislation are initiated.116 Competition authorities must notify the other 
party’s competition authorities of the enforcement of domestic competition law insofar that 
important interests of the other party are affected.117 
 
Most obligations from the competition title in the EU-C&P do not constrain regulatory autonomy 
as they merely require the maintenance of certain existing competition laws and their effective 
application. The three types of practices in Article 259.2 EU-C&P may come closest to 
substantive obligations, but this concern is alleviated by the addition of “in accordance with their 
respective competition laws” to each. Moreover, from the perspective of de facto regulatory 
autonomy, Article 266 EU-C&P is relevant as it exempts these provisions from the scope of 
dispute settlement. 
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The competition provisions in the EU-Singapore and EU-Georgia RTAs can be found in Articles 
12.1-12.2 and 203-204 respectively. As with the EU-C&P RTA, Articles 12.14 EU-Singapore 
and 207 EU-Georgia exempt these provisions from dispute settlement proceedings. The parties 
are required to maintain effective comprehensive legislation on specific competition related 
issues insofar as these affect trade. Again, it is expressly noted that the autonomy to develop 
and enforce such rules remains with the parties. Authorities able to implement the legislation 
effectively must be maintained, and the competition legislation must be applied in a transparent 
and non-discriminatory manner. The application of the legislation must also respect the 
principles of procedural fairness and rights of defence of the parties concerned, including the 
right of the parties concerned to be heard prior to deciding on a case.  
 
As with Article VI:1 GATS, and Articles 223.1 EU-Georgia and 14.5 EU-Singapore, the 
obligation to apply legislation, in casu competition legislation, may raise regulatory autonomy 
concerns. The review of application may involve, in certain cases, substantive review. Most 
relevant is the requirement to apply the competition legislation in a non-discriminatory manner. 
This requirement goes substantially beyond the reasonable, impartial and objective standard of 
Article VI:1 GATS. Again, the de facto constraints on regulatory autonomy are likely to be limited 
as these obligations cannot be enforced through dispute settlement. 
 
6.2 Procurement 
Article XIII GATS limits the scope of the most important disciplines in GATS vis-à-vis 
government procurement. Because of the importance of procurement in international trade, 
transparency in government procurement was taken up as another of the Singapore Issues.118 
Aside from GATS, the WTO’s plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) contains 
disciplines on procurement, The EU is a party to this agreement which was renegotiated and 
entered into force on 6 April 2014.119 In addition to these rules, the EU has addressed 
procurement in the selected RTAs. Although Articles 107.2 EU-C&P, 8.1.2 (d) EU-Singapore 
and 76.2 EU-Georgia exclude procurement from the scope of the chapter on trade in services 
and establishment, the respective Title VI, Chapter 10 and Chapter 8, which address 
government procurement, apply to services as well. For the EU-C&P RTA, this is the case only 
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insofar as the services are specified in Appendix 1 of Annex XII.120 Part 2 of Annex 10-E to the 
EU-Singapore RTA contains the services commitments for the EU for procurement.121 No such 
limitation of the scope of the procurement obligations is included in the EU-Georgia DCFTA. 
The obligations set out in all three sections on government procurement are elaborate. 
Moreover, an analysis of the constraints on regulatory autonomy that result from these 
provisions cannot be made without addressing the GPA. Doing so would lead us too far astray 
in the context of this report. Nonetheless, one may assume that these disciplines contain some 
additional constraints on regulatory autonomy. 
 
6.3 Investment 
Investment is, as noted, partially covered by Mode 3 services supply under the GATS rules. It is 
also one of the Singapore Issues.122 The investment relations between EU Member States and 
the RTA counterparts addressed here are also governed by bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs).123 As the analysis of the scope of the services chapters highlighted, there is even more 
overlap between trade in services and investment within the RTAs’ sections on establishment. 
In addition to these obligations, the RTAs address investment. The EU-C&P RTA, for which 
negotiations started before the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty reforms which granted 
exclusive competence on investment to the EU, does not include an investment chapter. Its 
section on establishment is expressly limited and does not cover “provisions on investment 
protection, such as provisions specifically relating to expropriation and fair and equitable 
treatment, nor does it cover investor-State dispute settlement procedures.”124 Article 80.2 EU-
Georgia states that if parties encounter obstacles to establishment, these obstacles can be 
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addressed for example through further negotiations, “including with respect to investment 
protection and to investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures.”  
 
The EU-Singapore RTA does contain a Chapter 9 on investment protection, for which the 
negotiations were finalised in October 2014, over a year after the other parts of the 
agreement.125 It applies to all investments made by investors of one party. The main obligations 
are:  
a. a national treatment obligation in Article 9.3 EU-Singapore.126 The obligation contains a 
built-in general exceptions provision similar to Articles XIV GATS or XX GATT 1994. It is 
elaborated in Article 9.5 EU-Singapore as concerns losses owing to war or other armed 
conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency, revolt, insurrection or riot;127 
b. the obligation to accord in its territory fair and equitable treatment and full physical 
protection and security to investments of the other party; 
c. the obligation to refrain from direct or indirect expropriation; 
d. the guarantee that transfer of an investment, or a transfer related to an investment, is 
free. 
These obligations undoubtedly constrain regulatory autonomy in the context of services. 
Although the provisions in the investment chapter are elaborate, there remains ample room for 
interpretation. Considering the scope of this report, an analysis of such provisions cannot be 
conducted here. 
 
6.4 Subsidies 
As noted, the services chapters of the selected RTAs exclude subsidies from their scope. 
However, under GATS, subsidies are not excluded and are subject to the disciplines. 
Additionally, all three agreements contain transparency obligations for subsidies. In the case of 
the EU-C&P and EU-Georgia RTAs, no further disciplines on subsidies exist.  
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However, Articles 12.5-12.10 and Annex 12-A EU-Singapore—part of the Chapter on 
competition and related matters—do contain disciplines applicable to subsidies in services. The 
definition of subsidies put forth in Article 1.1 SCM Agreement is extended to subsidies granted 
in relation to the production of services, although this does not prejudice the outcome of 
negotiations on Article XV GATS. Only specific subsidies within the meaning of Article 2 SCM 
Agreement are targeted.  
 
The prohibited subsidies listed in Article 12.7 EU-Singapore are considered specific subsidies. 
For trade in services, the relevant prohibited subsidies are: (i) legal arrangements whereby a 
party’s government is responsible to cover debts or liabilities of certain undertakings without any 
limitation as to the amount of those debts and liabilities or the duration of such responsibility; 
and (ii) support to insolvent undertakings in whatever form without a credible restructuring plan 
and without the undertaking significantly contributing itself to the costs of restructuring. These 
subsidies are not prohibited if the subsidising party, upon request of the other party, has 
demonstrated that the subsidy in question does not affect trade of the other party. Moreover, 
there is an exception for subsidies granted to remedy a serious disturbance in a party’s 
economy, i.e. an exceptional, temporary and significant crisis which affects the whole economy 
of the party. Subsidies of type (ii) are not prohibited if the subsidies are granted as 
compensation for carrying out public service obligations. 
 
For subsidies other than those specific subsidies prohibited by Article 12.7, Article 12.8 contains 
a best endeavour obligation to remedy or remove distortions of competition caused by these 
subsidies insofar as they (are likely to) affect trade between the EU and Singapore. The parties 
also agree to exchange information on these subsidies. Annex 12-A to the EU-Singapore RTA 
elaborates, in paragraph 1, on the ‘other subsidies’ as defined in Article 12.8 EU-Singapore, 
stating that these subsidies should, in principle, not be granted when they affect trade between 
the parties. Paragraph 2 contains exceptions to this principle for specific types of subsidies, 
given that (i) they are necessary to achieve an objective of public interest; (ii) the amounts of the 
subsidies involved are limited to the minimum needed to achieve this objective; and (iii) their 
effect on the trade of the other party is limited. The specific subsidies that may be granted, 
under these conditions are subsidies: 
a. having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such subsidies 
are granted on a non-discriminatory basis; 
b. to make up for damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; 
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c. to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; 
d. to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of one of the parties; 
e. to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, 
where such aid does not affect conditions of trade and competition between the 
parties;128 
f. to companies that supply clearly defined services of general economic interest, insofar 
as the subsidies are limited to the costs of providing such services; 
g. to promote culture and heritage conservation where these subsidies do not affect 
conditions of trade and competition between the parties; and 
h. to promote the execution of an important project of regional or bilateral interest. 
Parties may have recourse to dispute settlement if prohibited subsidies are considered to be 
granted.129 
 
Subsidies are an important policy tool. Disciplining their use must be balanced alongside the 
potential to grant subsidies. The importance of subsidies becomes evident from the EU’s 
approach in its GATS Schedule and in the services chapters of its RTAs. The most relevant 
obligation at hand, from the perspective of regulatory autonomy, is the prohibition of two very 
specific types of subsidies. It is nonetheless notable that these prohibited subsidies can be 
granted. The subsidies need to be justified only ex post and upon request of the other party by 
demonstrating that the subsidy does not affect trade between the parties. Consequentially, the 
scope of the obligation, the possibility to justify the use of the subsidies and the lack of 
enforceability through dispute settlement limit the constraints on regulatory autonomy from this 
obligation. 
 
6.5 Approximation 
The EU-C&P and EU-Singapore RTAs do not address approximation. Articles 103, 113, 122, 
126 and Annexes XV-A to D, 271-276, 277-278 and 414-417 EU-Georgia contain disciplines on 
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approximation. The elaborate focus on approximation is in line with Article 1 (h) of the 
agreement, which sets out the gradual economic integration of Georgia into the EU internal 
market through comprehensive regulatory approximation as an objective of the agreement. 
These obligations only apply to Georgia and therefore do not constrain EU regulatory autonomy. 
 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION 
This report consists of four parts. The first part identifies the selection of case studies for this 
report, a subsequent report and the doctoral dissertation linked to this research track. On the 
basis of a mapping exercise of services disciplines in EU RTA chapters and an analysis of 
treaty interpretation provisions, the EU-Colombia & Peru RTA, the EU-Singapore RTA and the 
EU-Georgia DCFTA are selected. Subsequently, this section establishes the interpretative 
framework for the RTAs. It is submitted that there is a presumption to interpret the provisions in 
the (services chapters of the) RTAs in conformity with WTO obligations. This presumption is 
rebutted only when there is a clear indication that the negotiators intended to deviate from the 
interpretation given to terms in the context of the WTO. 
 
The second part of this report addresses the structural flexibilities of the services chapters of the 
selected EU RTAs, which are situated at the level of the obligations themselves, and of the 
scheduling approach for specific commitments. 
 
In the third section, the scope of the selected EU RTAs is analysed. Although the scope of the 
chapters is wider than under GATS, several exemptions are added in comparison to GATS. The 
main finding of this section relates to the interpretation of the ‘modes of supply’ in the services 
chapters. In particular, the ‘Mode 3’ equivalent, establishment, gives rise to concern as its 
interpretation is substantially wider than is the case under GATS in all three RTAs. From a 
GATS perspective, this is perhaps unexpected, as the approach seems to reflect EU internal 
market law. 
 
Finally, in section D, the constraints on regulatory autonomy from the unconditional obligations 
in the services chapters of the selected EU RTAs are assessed. First, it is explained that there 
is no equivalent to the unconditional MFN obligation in GATS. Second, all transparency 
obligations in the selected EU RTAs’ services chapters apply unconditionally. Their constraints 
on regulatory autonomy are, as with GATS, rather limited considering the procedural nature of 
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most obligations. Even in a case where there could be a substantive element to the obligations, 
we consider the implications for regulatory autonomy to be minor. Third, we mention one 
domestic regulation obligation, in the EU-C&P RTA, but do not assess its constraints in this 
report because of its inseparable link with its conditional counterparts under GATS, the EU-
Singapore RTA and the EU-Georgia RTA. Fourth, obligations related to monopolies and 
exclusive service suppliers are analysed from the perspective of constraints on regulatory 
autonomy. The obligations related to competition in this context largely refer back to domestic 
competition law and therefore would not constrain regulatory autonomy. Additionally, there are 
non-discrimination obligations which constrain regulatory autonomy insofar that they require 
governments to eliminate any discrimination from the supply of services by state monopolies 
with a commercial character. Moreover, the EU-Georgia Schedule, contains more extensive 
commitments compared to GATS and the other two agreements, and constrains regulatory 
autonomy to some extent. It is possible that this merely reflects reality in a way similar to the 
binding overhang or ‘water’ between bound tariff rates and applied tariff rates. Fifth, the 
obligations related to current and capital transactions are assessed. Aside from assessing the 
scope of these obligations vis-à-vis those under GATS, we acknowledge that actual constraints 
are very hard to assess without further in-depth analysis as to whether these concerns are 
mitigated by specific financial services disciplines in the RTAs. Sixth and finally, the RTAs 
contain unconditional GATS-X disciplines on competition, procurement, investment, subsidies 
and approximation. With the exception of investment, most of these provisions either do not 
constrain regulatory autonomy or are exempted from recourse to dispute settlement. 
 
In conclusion, and unsurprisingly, the unconditional obligations in the EU RTAs’ services 
chapters do not appear to constrain regulatory autonomy unduly. The scope of the chapters, 
however, does have substantial implications for the analysis of the non-discrimination and 
market access obligations that are the subject of the next report in this research track. 
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